Collective Trauma From the Lab to the Real World: The Effects of the Holocaust on Contemporary Israeli Political Cognitions

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*This research tested whether chronic or contextually activated Holocaust exposure is associated with more extreme political attitudes among Israeli Jews. Study 1 (*N = 57*), and Study 2 (*N = 61*) found that Holocaust primes increased support for aggressive policies against a current adversary and decreased support for political compromise via an amplified sense of identification with Zionist ideology. These effects, however, were obtained only under an exclusive but not an inclusive framing of the Holocaust. Study 3 (*N = 152*) replicated these findings in a field study conducted around Holocaust Remembrance Day and showed that the link between Holocaust exposure, ideological identification, and militancy also occurs in real-life settings. Study 4 (*N = 867*) demonstrated in a nationally representative survey that Holocaust survivors and their descendants exhibited amplified existential threat responses to contemporary political violence, which were associated with militancy and opposition to peaceful compromises. Together, these studies illustrate the* Holocaustization *of Israeli political cognitions 70 years later.*

Collective trauma constitutes an earth-shattering, threatening episode in a group's history that affects not only direct victims, but the entire community. Collective trauma can transform the way survivors perceive the world and understand the relationship between their group and other groups unrelated to the initial victimization (Vollhardt, 2012). Although the psychological wounds of second- and third-generation survivors are generally subtler and only infrequently rise to the level of diagnosable posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), these individuals may exhibit heightened individual and collective fear, feelings of vulnerability, injured national pride, and humiliation (Lifton, 2005). These distal effects of collective trauma may extend beyond the families of the original survivors and affect the entire community, even to the extent that the trauma becomes part of the national psyche, contributes to the creation of a national narrative, and serves as a prism through which current affairs are perceived and understood. According to Lifton (2005), survivors of collective trauma and their descendants often engage in "survivor missions" which entail the use of violence to rehabilitate feelings of injured national pride. Victims may displace aggression towards contemporary adversaries that are unrelated to the initial offense (Ein-Dor & Hirschberger, 2013), such that the pains and woes of past events become conflated with the current conflict (Lifton, 2005).

The Holocaust, which is the focus of the current research, is a traumatic event of such magnitude that some find it incomparable to any other tragedies or genocides. Although we agree that the Holocaust is unique in many respects, it is also emblematic of the all too common perpetration of genocide, a universal problem relevant to both victims, witnesses, and potential future victims. As eminent Holocaust historian Yehuda Bauer contends: "if the Holocaust is not a universal problem than why should a public school system in Philadelphia, New York, or Timbuktu teach it? . . . . Anything that happens once can happen again" (Bauer, 1979, p. 5). Though each instance of genocide has both unique and common features, the long-term effects of the Holocaust as the quintessential modern genocide may reveal the possible consequences of collective trauma on other people in other contexts. Because of the current embroilment of Israeli Jews in protracted intergroup conflict with its neighbors in the Middle East, and the implications of this conflict for the entire world, research on the psychological consequences of the Holocaust on attitudes toward this current conflict is of considerable relevance to the world today.

For Israeli Jews, the Holocaust constitutes a collective national trauma that plays a key role in shaping identity, politics, and culture. It stands as a symbol of the past powerlessness of the Jewish people, promotes a siege mentality in which the world is viewed as inherently hostile to Jews (Bar-Tal & Antebbi, 1992; Hirschberger, Lifshin, Seeman, Ein-Dor, & Pyszczynski, in press), and serves as a constant reminder to be vigilant and take every possible precaution to ensure that genocide against the Jewish people never happens again. Thus, the memory of the Holocaust serves as a reference point for understanding Israelis' relationships with other groups (Imhoff et al., 2016) and reactivates the age-old Jewish mindset of being "an expiring people, forever on the verge of ceasing to be" (Rawidowitz, 1967, p. 423).

This perception of the Holocaust may exert a profound influence on Israeli policy, in ways that do not necessarily serve the best interests of its people. For example, research indicates that when Israeli participants were exposed to reminders of the Holocaust juxtaposed with criticism from international allies, even left-wing participants who typically support peaceful policies increased their support for aggressive and militant policies (Hirschberger et al., in press). The current research begins with two experiments that replicate the effect of priming thoughts of the Holocaust on political militancy, but it goes further by revealing the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon and showing that

the effects of the Holocaust on contemporary political attitudes extend beyond momentary responses to laboratory manipulations and are chronically and continuously evident in the real world. Specifically, we contend that this long-standing collective trauma amplifies the need for ideological identification, increases perceptions of existential threat, and makes present threats loom larger than they would otherwise, thus resulting in greater political militancy that can bring attempts at intergroup reconciliation to a standstill.

We also examine whether these effects of the Holocaust are inevitable or depend on how this tragedy is construed. Previous research suggests that framing collective trauma in inclusive terms compared with exclusive terms can mitigate the detrimental effects of the memory of this trauma (Vollhardt, 2013; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). The current research examines whether different framings of the Holocaust influence political attitudes regarding war and peace in a population deeply immersed in political conflict.

The Holocaust is a central component of Jewish identity (Pew Research Center, 2013) and serves as a lens through which Jews and Israelis understand current threats and challenges (Segev, 2000). Zionism, the ideology that led to the creation of the State of Israel, is predicated on the notion that a chronic existential threat looms over the Jewish people and that Jews must be independent and strong to survive. Because the Holocaust stands as a reminder of Jewish helplessness, it serves as a central justification for Zionist ideology. Indeed, research indicates that participating in trips to Holocaust-related sites in Poland increase identification with Zionism among third-generation Israelis and reduces their willingness to contemplate the universal lessons of the Holocaust (Lazar, Chitin, Gross, & Bar-On, 2004). From a social representations perspective (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), the specific manner in which a historical event is construed elicits particular aspects of social identity that influences responses to the event. In the case of the Holocaust, priming an exclusivist representation is likely to increase adherence to Zionism—an exclusivist and self-reliant social identity. According to the identity mobilization hypothesis (Liu, Sibley, & Huang, 2014), this link between social representations and specific social identities ultimately affects support for specific social policies. We, therefore, hypothesize a causal process whereby exclusivist Holocaust reminders elicit greater adherence to Zionism (i.e., ideological identification), which, in turn, is related to greater support for belligerent policies and less support for peaceful processes.

The research reported here investigates the lingering impact of the Holocaust on contemporary Israelis' attitudes regarding the conflicts in which their nation is currently embroiled. Toward this end, two methodological approaches were combined in this research—experiments and surveys—to provide both evidence of a causal impact of Holocaust-related thoughts and ecological validity regarding this process. Our research begins where previous research ends; in two studies, we conceptually replicate and extend some of the previous research on collective trauma on samples of Israeli Jews. We go beyond previous research by examining whether increased ideological identification is the mechanism by which the Holocaust exerts its effect on contemporary political attitudes. Next, we provide ecological validity for our analysis by examining whether during Holocaust Remembrance Day in Israel, high exposure to the Holocaust is associated with political radicalization through a sense of greater ideological identification. In the final stage of this research, we show that the effects of the Holocaust extend far beyond incidental exposures to Holocaust-related materials by reporting a large-scale survey on a representative sample of the adult Israeli population that examines whether Holocaust survivors and their descendants exhibit stronger perceptions of threat to contemporary political violence associated with a radicalization of political attitudes. Our overall hypothesis is that Holocaust exposure—whether experimentally primed or observed in the community—is associated with a radicalization of political cognitions, an increase in support for militancy, and a decrease in support for reconciliation through a process of increased ideological identification and heightened existential threat perceptions.

STUDY 1

Study 1 had two primary goals: to determine whether Holocaust reminders influence support for violent solutions in a current conflict with an adversary unrelated to the perpetrators of the Holocaust and to reveal the underlying mechanisms linking Holocaust salience to political attitudes. Toward this end, we examined whether reminders of the Holocaust boost feelings of ideological identification (i.e., Zionism) and whether this relationship may explain the impact of the Holocaust on political cognitions.

To establish that the effects of the Holocaust are not merely a specific demonstration of the well-established effects of death primes on political attitudes, we compared the Holocaust prime with a mortality salience (MS) prime (Pyszczynski et al., 2006). Thus, the purpose of Study 1 was threefold: (1) to determine whether Holocaust reminders influence support for militancy among Jewish Israelis in an ongoing conflict with a different adversary; (2) if so, whether these effects and the processes through which they occur are the same or different from those of more generic death reminders; and (3) whether these effects are mediated by levels of ideological identification.

Method

Participants. A community sample of 57 Jewish-Israelis—37 women and 20 men, with an age range between 19 and 88 years of age ($M = 27$; $SD = 11.2$)—volunteered to participate in the study.

Materials and Procedure. The study took place in a shopping center in the Tel-Aviv region in Israel. Two research assistants sitting at a booth solicited pedestrians to answer questions. Those who agreed (recruitment rate was 60%) received a packet of questionnaires that took about 10 minutes to complete. The first questionnaire was an irrelevant personality inventory (the first 30 items of the Big-Five inventory [BFI: John & Srivastava, 1999]) intended to conceal the purpose of the study. Participants were then randomly assigned to either a Holocaust-salience condition or to one of two controls. In the *Holocaust-salience condition*, they were asked to answer two questions about the Holocaust: "Please think about the murder of six million Jews by the Nazis during the Holocaust. What thoughts do you have about the Holocaust?" and "Please briefly describe the emotions that you have when you think about the murder of six million Jews during the Holocaust." The first control condition was *MS*, in which mentions of the Holocaust were replaced with "personal death" ("Please think about your personal death. What thoughts do you have about your death?"; "Please briefly describe the emotions that you have when you think about your death."). The second control condition was a *pain-salience* condition in which references to the Holocaust were replaced with "severe physical pain" ("Please think about severe physical pain. What thoughts do you have about experiencing severe physical pain?"; "Please briefly describe the emotions that you have when you think about severe physical pain."). This procedure was modeled after the procedures used to prime death in terror management studies (Pyszczynski et al., 1996). Participants then answered a question measuring ideological identification: "To what extent do you define yourself as a Zionist," rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*). Next, participants responded to 11 questions measuring support for a military rather than a diplomatic solution to the conflict between Israel and Iran (e.g., "The Israeli Defense Forces should strike Iran's nuclear facilities" and "Negotiations with Iran are the only way to stop Iran's nuclear race" reverse-coded; Hirschberger, Pyszczynski, & Ein-Dor, 2009), rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*), which was adequately reliable ($\alpha = .71$). Finally, they completed a demographic questionnaire and were debriefed.

Results and Discussion

To examine the effect of Holocaust salience on militancy, we conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), which revealed a significant effect, $F(2, 54) = 2.83$, $p = .05$, $\eta^2 = .10$. Bonferroni

Figure 1. Ideological identification mediated the effects of Holocaust primes on political militancy in the form of support for a preemptive strike against Iran. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

post hoc analyses indicated that participants in the Holocaust condition ($M = 4.54$, $SD = 1.04$, $p = .05$) and in the personal death condition ($M = 4.59$, $SD = 1.13$, $p = .03$) had higher militancy scores than controls ($M = 3.83$, $SD = .99$).[1]

To determine whether the link between Holocaust salience and militancy (i.e., support for a preemptive strike on Iran) was mediated by levels of ideological identification, we employed a mediation analysis using Hayes' (2013) PROCESS procedure (model 4). To this end, we created two variables in which we effect coded the Holocaust condition to compare the Holocaust prime (-1) with the death prime (1) and the pain prime (1). Next, we conducted two models in which the outcome variable was support for a preemptive strike on Iran, the mediator was ideological identification, and the predictor was either Holocaust prime versus pain or Holocaust prime versus mortality salience. In the model in which the Holocaust prime versus pain was the predictor, the second dummy variable (Holocaust prime versus mortality salience) served as a covariate, and in the model in which Holocaust prime versus mortality salience was the predictor, the first dummy variable (Holocaust prime versus pain) served as a covariate. As shown in Figure 1 (which combines both models for the sake of simplicity), Holocaust salience increased participants' levels of ideological identification compared with the pain condition ($b = .53$, $t_{(55)} = -2.07$, $SE = .26$, $p = .04$). In turn, higher ideological identification was associated with greater support for a preemptive strike on Iran ($b = .36$, $t_{(55)} = 4.34$, $SE = .08$, $p < .0001$) after controlling for the Holocaust prime. A bias-corrected bootstrap analysis indicated that the mediation path from Holocaust priming (Holocaust vs. pain) via levels of ideological identification to support for a preemptive strike on Iran was significant (95% CI: $-.44$, $-.03$; the effect of the prime decreased from $b = -.35$, $p = .05$ to $b = -.15$, $p = .33$,). No significant difference was found between the Holocaust condition and the death prime condition in ideological identification ($b = -.30$, $t_{(55)} = -1.20$, $SE = .25$, $p = .23$).

The second mediation model indicated that mortality salience marginally increased support for a preemptive strike against Iran compared with the pain condition ($b = -.29$, $t_{(55)} = -1.94$, $SE = .15$, $p = .058$) but did not affect the levels of ideological identification ($b = -.24$, $t_{(55)} = -.94$, $SE = .25$, $p = .35$). In other words, both death primes and Holocaust primes increased support for a preemptive strike on Iran, but only thoughts of the Holocaust (vs. pain) increased the propensity for intergroup

[1] To examine whether gender had an effect on the results of Study 1, we conducted a two-way ANOVA, which indicated that gender had no significant main effect on militancy, $F(1, 50) = 2.64$, $p = .11$, $\eta^2 = .05$, nor did it interact with Holocaust salience, $F(2, 50) = 1.66$, $p = .20$, $\eta^2 = .06$.

violence through greater levels of ideological identification. It is important to emphasize that although these results may suggest that mortality salience primes and Holocaust primes elicit the same effect through a different process, the current study cannot support such a conclusion as it would require comparing the mortality salience and Holocaust paths. The sample size of Study 1 cannot support such an analysis, and future research may wish to further investigate this question that is only tangential to the focus of the current research.

STUDY 2

Does the memory of the Holocaust inevitably lead to negative consequences? Vollhardt (2013) has made an important theoretical distinction between inclusive and exclusive framings of historical trauma such that inclusive framings (e.g., "the Holocaust is a crime against all of humanity") are associated with more peaceful political outcomes compared with exclusive framings of the Holocaust ("the Holocaust is a crime against the Jewish people"). Consistent with this idea, Wohl and Branscombe (2005) found that when the Holocaust was framed exclusively, it led participants to assign more guilt to contemporary Germans and feel less forgiveness towards them as compared to a condition in which the Holocaust was framed inclusively.

In the current study, we attempted to replicate this distinction on an Israeli-Jewish population in the context of an ongoing intractable conflict and examine (1) whether different framings of the Holocaust would have a different effect on support for belligerent or peaceful policies; and (2) whether exclusive framings of collective trauma exert their effects through greater identification with exclusivist ideologies (i.e., Zionism). We posited that an exclusive framing of the Holocaust would increase belligerent attitudes and that this effect would be mediated by elevated ideological identification, as in Study 1. Furthermore, to extend the generalizability of these findings beyond the conflict between Israel and Iran, we also examined the effect of reminders of the Holocaust on the willingness to make compromises for peace with the Palestinians.

Method

Participants. Sixty-nine Jewish-Israeli undergraduate students—35 women and 34 men, ranging in age between 18 and 47 years ($M = 28$, $SD = 9.3$)—participated in the study for course credit.

Materials and Procedure. Participants who signed up for the experiment were invited to a lab room. Sessions included up to five participants at a time. Participants were given a questionnaire packet that took about 10–15 minutes to complete. First, all participants completed the same irrelevant personality questionnaire, as in Study 1. They were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In the *Holocaust Jewish* condition, participants were asked to answer two open-ended questions as in Study 1, but in this study all references to the Holocaust were replaced with references to the Holocaust as "a crime against the Jewish people." In the *Holocaust Human* condition, the Holocaust was referred to as "a crime against humanity." The third *pain salience* condition was identical to the control condition used in Study 1. Following these primes, participants completed the ideological identification question and the support for preemptive violence against Iran scale (Hirschberger et al., 2009; $\alpha = .82$) that were used in Study 1. They then responded to a question assessing their support for territorial compromise for peace with the Palestinians ("For peace with the Palestinians, I support an Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in the 1967 Six-Day War [Judea and Samaria]"), rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Finally, participants completed a demographic questionnaire and were debriefed.

Results and Discussion

To examine the effect of Holocaust salience on Israelis' political attitudes toward Iran and the Palestinians, we conducted a series of one-way ANOVAs, which revealed significant effects, $F(2, 66) = 4.16$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .12$ for support for violence, and $F(2, 66) = 5.48$, $p = .006$, $\eta^2 = .15$ for compromise. Bonferroni post hoc analyses indicated that participants in the Jewish-Holocaust condition showed higher support for a preemptive strike against Iran ($M = 4.87$, $SD = .93$) and lower willingness to compromise with the Palestinians for peace ($M = 3.15$, $SD = 2.03$) than participants in the human-Holocaust condition ($M = 4.07$, $SD = 1.00$, $p = .008$ for support of violence, and $M = 5.17$, $SD = 1.99$, $p = .002$ for compromise) and/or participants in the control condition ($M = 4.22$, $SD = .88$, $p = .03$ for support of violence, and $M = 4.67$, $SD = 2.15$, $p = .02$ for compromise).[2]

Next, to examine whether the link between Holocaust salience and political attitudes was mediated by ideological identification, we employed mediation analyses similar to those used in Study 1 (PROCESS, model 4). Specifically, we created two contrasts in which we effect coded the Holocaust primes to compare the Jewish-Holocaust condition (-1) with the human-Holocaust condition (1) and with the pain condition (1). Next, we conducted four models in which the outcome variables were support for a preemptive strike on Iran or support for compromise for peace with the Palestinians (two analyses for each outcome variable). The mediator was ideological identification, and the predictor was either Jewish-Holocaust prime versus pain or Jewish-Holocaust prime versus human-Holocaust. In the model in which the Jewish-Holocaust prime versus pain was the predictor, the second dummy variable (Jewish-Holocaust prime versus human-Holocaust) served as a covariate, and in the model in which Jewish-Holocaust prime versus human-Holocaust was the predictor, the first dummy variable (Jewish-Holocaust prime versus pain) served as a covariate (Aiken & West 1991). As shown in Figure 2 (which combines the models for the sake of simplicity), these analyses revealed that the Jewish-Holocaust condition increased participants' levels of ideological identification compared with the human-Holocaust condition ($b = -.60$, $t_{(67)} = -2.48$, $SE = .24$, $p = .02$), and with the pain condition ($b = -.44$, $t_{(67)} = -1.83$, $SE = .24$, $p = .07$; marginally significant). Higher levels of ideological identification were, in turn, associated with higher support for a preemptive strike against Iran ($b = .30$, $t_{(67)} = 4.40$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$) after controlling for the Holocaust prime. The second analysis showed that ideological identification was also associated with lower support for compromise for peace with the Palestinians ($b = -.34$, $t_{(67)} = -2.09$, $SE = .17$, $p = .041$) after controlling for the Holocaust prime. Bias-corrected bootstrap analyses indicated that the mediation paths from Holocaust priming via levels of ideological identification to support of a preemptive strike on Iran were significant (95% CI: $-.37$, $-.05$ for Jewish-Holocaust vs. human-Holocaust, and 95% CI: $-.31$, $-.04$ for Jewish-Holocaust vs. pain), as were the paths from the Holocaust prime via ideological identification to support for compromise for peace with the Palestinians (95% CI: $.04$, $.49$ for Jewish-Holocaust vs. human-Holocaust, and 95% CI: $.01$, $.43$ for Jewish-Holocaust vs. pain). It should be noted that because the two dependent variables were not counterbalanced, it is possible that attitudes towards peace with the Palestinians were effected by responses to the Iran scale. One possible effect is that for the Iran outcome, all treatment conditions end up on the right side of the midpoint of the scale (4), that is, all treatment conditions are militant and the difference between conditions is only .6. The size of the effect for the second outcome is much bigger and much more consequential: The two treatment

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[2] To examine whether gender had an effect on the results of Study 2, we conducted two-way ANOVAs. The analyses revealed that gender had a marginally significant main effect on willingness to compromise with the Palestinians for peace, $F(1, 61) = 3.58$, $p = .06$, $\eta^2 = .04$, which indicated that men ($M = 4.63$, $SE = .31$) were more willing to compromise than women ($M = 3.81$, $SE = .30$). Gender, however, did not interact with Holocaust salience on willingness to compromise, $F(2, 61) = 0.75$, $p = .52$, $\eta^2 = .03$, nor on support for violence, $F(2, 61) = 1.92$, $p = .13$, $\eta^2 = .07$. Gender had no main effect on support for violence, $F(2, 61) = 1.15$, $p = .29$, $\eta^2 = .01$.

Figure 2. Mediation model indicating that ideological identification mediated the effects of primes of the Holocaust as a crime against the Jewish people on political militancy, in the form of support for a preemptive strike against Iran, and support for compromise for peace with the Palestinians. Values represents unstandardized coefficients. Values in parentheses are of total effects (i.e., not controlling for the mediator). [†] $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

conditions find themselves on either sides of the middle point. It could be that the order of the questionnaires are responsible for this difference.

The results of Study 2 extend the results of Study 1 by showing that thinking about the Holocaust increases support for violent solutions to current conflicts and reduces the willingness to make compromises for peace. Both effects can, at least in part, be explained as a consequence of amplified ideological identification resulting from Holocaust reminders. Study 2 further shows that the link between Holocaust reminders and support for political violence is not inevitable and depends on the contextual framing of the Holocaust. When the Holocaust is framed as a crime against the Jewish people, it increases the propensity for violence and decreases support for peaceful compromise; when the Holocaust is framed as a crime against humanity, however, these effects are mitigated, and there is no longer a link between Holocaust salience, ideological identification, and belligerent attitudes.

STUDY 3

Study 3 examines whether the process revealed in Studies 1 and 2 also occurs in the real world. The setting for this study was Holocaust Remembrance Day in Israel, a day in which the entire country is engaged with the memory of the Holocaust. The day is marked by a one-minute siren during which traffic comes to a halt and people throughout the country stop all activities and stand for a moment of silence. All television and radio programs are dedicated exclusively to the Holocaust, and ceremonies commemorating the destruction of European Jewry are held in all educational institutes from kindergarten to university. We leveraged the fact that there are individual differences in the extent to which people are exposed to the Holocaust on this day because people can choose the degree to which they want to participate in Holocaust-related activities. We also examined participants' sense of ideological identification, as in Studies 1 and 2, to provide further support for the mediation model found in these experiments in an observational study. In Study 3, we hypothesized that in daily Israeli life, the association between Holocaust exposure and political militancy would be mediated by high levels of ideological identification.

Method

Participants. One hundred and fifty-two Jewish Israeli adults participated in the study during the two days following Holocaust Remembrance Day (April 9–10, 2013). Women comprised 51% of the sample, and participants' ages ranged between 18 and 77 years of age ($M = 34.00$, $SD = 12.22$). The sample was a relatively educated sample, with 58% college or university graduates, and most of the participants (78%) were Ashkenazi (European) Jews. Participants were recruited from two large universities in Israel. We randomly sampled courses and asked students in classes to fill out the anonymous questionnaire. We also surveyed volunteers in major train stations in Israel. All participants received a packet of questionnaires and were asked to complete them in the order the questions were presented. This procedure took about 10 minutes to complete.

Materials and Procedure: Holocaust exposure. We measured participants active Holocaust exposure using the following questions: "Did you participate in a Holocaust memorial ceremony this year?" "During the past week, did you watch movies and/or television programs that deal with the Holocaust?" "During the past week, did you listen to radio shows about the Holocaust?" "During the past week did you browse internet websites with Holocaust-related content?" and "Did you take part in any public discussions on the internet, in the past week, that dealt with the Holocaust?" Possible responses to these questions were as follows: (1) not at all (2) once or twice (3) three-four time (4) five times or more. Responses were recoded into three categories: no active Holocaust exposure (0 times = 0), low active Holocaust exposure (1–2 events = 1), and high active Holocaust exposure (3 events or more = 2).

Political militancy. As in Studies 1 and 2, we used the 11-item scale assessing support for a strike on Iran (Hirschberger et al., 2009, $\alpha = .72$).

Ideological identification. As in Studies 1 and 2, we used the single-item question: "To what extent do you define yourself as a Zionist" on a 6-point scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*).

Sociodemographic variables. At the end of the study, participants completed a demographic sheet that included questions on age, gender, education level, political orientation, and ethnicity.

Results and Discussion

Preliminary analyses revealed that 4% of participants (six respondents) were not actively exposed to any Holocaust-related content on Holocaust Remembrance Day. Sixty-five percent ($N = 100$) reported low Holocaust exposure, and 31% ($N = 47$) reported high Holocaust exposure. Because of the low prevalence of participants with no exposure to any Holocaust-related content on Holocaust Remembrance Day, we combined this group with the low-exposure group (similar results were obtained if participants with no exposure were excluded from the analysis).

As a first step of testing our hypotheses, an independent samples *t*-test revealed a marginally significant difference between the high Holocaust exposure group ($M = 4.43$, $SD = 0.74$) and the low Holocaust exposure group ($M = 4.18$, $SD = 0.89$) in militancy $t(150) = 1.84$, $p = .06$.[3] Next, we examined whether ideological identification mediated the effect of Holocaust exposure (low = 0, high = 1) on support for militancy. The analysis revealed that participants with high exposure to the Holocaust were higher on ideological identification than participants with low exposure, $b = .46$, $t_{(150)} = 2.10$, $SE = .22$, $p = .03$. Higher ideological identification was, in turn, associated with greater support for a preemptive strike on Iran, $b = .31$, $t_{(150)} = 6.96$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$. A bias-corrected bootstrap analysis indicated that the mediation path from Holocaust group via levels of ideological

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[3] To examine whether gender had an effect on the results of Study 3, we conducted a two-way ANOVA, which indicated that gender had no significant main effect on militancy, $F(1, 146) = 2.04$, $p = .16$, $\eta^2 = .01$, nor interacted with Holocaust exposure, $F(2, 146) = 1.16$, $p = .28$, $\eta^2 = .01$.

identification to support for a preemptive strike on Iran was significant (CI: .018, .316). These results, in conjunction with Studies 1 and 2, suggest that the link between Holocaust exposure and political militancy is explained through an increased sense of ideological identification and that this effect is observed both in the laboratory and in real-life contexts.

As can be seen in Figure 3, the findings of Study 3 provide evidence that Holocaust Remembrance Day is associated with ideological identification, which is associated with support for militant policies among Israelis, much like what was found for laboratory priming inductions in Studies 1 and 2. It is important, however, to stress that unlike the two previous studies, Study 3 is a correlational study, not an experiment, and participants in this study could select the extent to which they participated in Holocaust-related activities. Just as this selection could influence ideological identification and political militancy, these two latter variables could influence Holocaust Remembrance Day participation. Moreover, we cannot be sure that our questions on Holocaust exposure reflect actual exposure or a subjective interpretation of exposure (i.e., one may feel more exposed than being exposed and vice versa). Therefore, Study 3 on its own cannot determine the causality or directionality of effects, and these can be inferred only in conjunction with Studies 1 and 2.

The implications of the results of the first three studies are that Holocaust remembrance may have unintended consequences that need to be considered. An inadvertent consequence of such massive exposure to hatred and violence against one's group seems to be greater alliance with the group's ideology, which is associated with greater support for violence ostensibly required to defend the group. This conclusion seems to suggest that Holocaust Remembrance Day is intrinsically exclusive. Holocaust survivor and historian Yehuda Elkana concurs and says: "Lately I have become more and more convinced that the deepest political and social factor that motivates much of Israeli society . . . is a profound existential angst fed by a particular interpretation of the lessons of the Holocaust and the readiness to believe that the whole world is against us, and that we are the eternal victim" (Elkana, 1988). Can there be a different way to remember historical trauma? The results of Study 2 suggest that a focus on the universal lessons of collective trauma may mitigate the deleterious effect of historical memory on present intergroup relations.

STUDY 4

The first three studies examined the effects of incidental or short-term reminders of the Holocaust on attitudes towards war and peace. Study 4 drew on a large-scale representative survey of the adult Jewish population in Israel to determine whether Holocaust survivors and their descendants exhibit a different pattern of thinking concerning the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians than the rest of the population. Recent research suggests that the offspring of Holocaust survivors show heightened preoccupation with potential threats of annihilation (Shrira, 2015). We, therefore, hypothesized that survivors and descendants would show elevated existential threat perceptions in response to exposure to contemporary political violence and that these perceptions would be associated with more violent and less peaceful political attitudes as compared to the non-Holocaust group. Thus, consistent with Studies 1–3, in Study 4 we predicted that Holocaust exposure is associated with political radicalization. Unlike Studies 1–3, however, we hypothesize that this effect also applies to chronic Holocaust exposure and is moderated by exposure to contemporary political violence such that participants in the Holocaust group with a high exposure to current violence will show political radicalization.

Studies 1–3 focused on ideological identification as a process variable explaining how the Holocaust exerts an effect on contemporary political attitudes. The ideology of Zionism is predicated on the belief that Jews are under constant existential threat (Yair, 2015). Thus, in Study 4 we focused on a specific component of the Zionist worldview and examined whether perceptions of existential threat underlie the chronic effects of the Holocaust on Israelis' political attitudes. By showing that existential

Figure 3. Ideological identification mediates the effects of Holocaust exposure on political militancy, in the form of support for a preemptive strike against Iran. [†] $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

threat mediates the effects of the Holocaust and exposure to violence on political outcomes, we indicate that it plays a similar role to that played by ideological identification in the previous three studies.

Because the focus of Study 4 is on the chronic effects of the Holocaust, the design of Study 4 is also different. In this study, we divided the sample into Holocaust survivors and descendants (Holocaust group) and compared them with the rest of the sample (non-Holocaust group). We hypothesized that the radicalizing effect of the Holocaust among survivors and descendants is higher among participants with high exposure to contemporary political violence because such violence rekindles a sense of imminent existential threat (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992) and therefore may blur the distinction between past traumas and contemporary conflict (Lazar et al., 2004) such that both types of threat become "virtually indistinguishable sources of pain and anger" (Lifton, 2005, p. 2263). Thus, we predicted that, in the Holocaust group, exposure to contemporary violence would be associated with greater political militancy and lower support for compromises for peace and that these associations would be mediated by perceptions of existential threat. Specifically, we predicted that exposure to contemporary violence would be associated with amplified threat perceptions in both groups but that only in the Holocaust group would threat perceptions be associated with radicalized political attitudes.

Methods

Participants. A survey of a nationally representative sample of adult Israeli-Jews was conducted during the Al-Aqsa Intifada between May 30 and July 18, 2007. The final sample included 867 respondents who were recruited through a random telephone survey. Interviews were conducted by an experienced, computerized survey institute in Israel using trained telephone-survey interviewers. The response rate among eligible responders was 53%. Given that the dialing methods in Israel, unlike the United States, include business phones (approximately 10%), which cannot be removed and were treated as failed attempts, and that the higher rates in U.S. studies typically do not include nonanswered phones (Galea et al., 2002), this response rate is considered acceptable. Fifty percent of the sample were women, and respondents' ages ranged from 18 to 98 years of age ($M = 45$, $SD = 16.14$). Thirty-one percent of the respondents were college or university graduates, 35% completed high school, 24.3% had partial academic education or postsecondary education, and 9.1% had less than 12 years of schooling. In terms of ethnicity, 52% of the respondents were Ashkenazi Jews (originally from Eastern or Western Europe or the United States), and 48% were Sepharadic Jews (originally from North Africa or Asia).[4] As for political orientation, 3% of participants consider themselves

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[4] Among those who were not born in Israel, approximately 12% were born in Africa and Asia, and 24% were born in Eastern or Western Europe or the United States.

extreme rightists, 30% rightists, 19% center right, 29% center, 11% left center, 7% leftists, and 1% extreme leftists.

Materials and Procedure: Holocaust descendancy. To categorize participants into the Holocaust and non-Holocaust groups, we asked two questions, similar to those used by Carmil and Breznitz (1991): (1) "Were you in a concentration camp, death camp, or a hiding place during the Holocaust?" and (2) "Was any one of your parents or grandparents a Holocaust survivor?" (1 = *yes*; 2 = *no*). Responses to these questions were coded into a dichotomous variable of 1 (*yes*) (Holocaust group; $N = 327$) and 0 (*no*) (non-Holocaust Group; $N = 540$). In the Holocaust group, most of the participants were descendants, and only 25 were actual Holocaust survivors.

Individual-level exposure to political violence. Three questions were used to measure exposure to political violence: "Have you experienced the death of a family member or a friend as a result of rockets or terror attacks?" (1 = *no*; 2 = *yes*); "Have you experienced an injury to yourself, a family member, or a friend as a result of rockets or terror attacks? (1 = *no*; 2 = *yes*); and "Have you directly witnessed rockets or terror attacks, or have been present at a site where there were injuries or fatalities? (1 = *no*; 2 = *yes*). For each respondent, we summarized responses on all three questions. Participants with a score of 3 were recoded as *nonexposed* (0), and those who scored 4 to 6 were recoded as *exposed* (1).

Perceived existential threat to Israel was examined using the following question: "How concerned are you about the possibility of an actual existential threat to the state of Israel (e.g., massive missile attacks, an unconventional weapons attack)?" Answers were provided on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 4 (*to a very large extent*). This measure is based on Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, and Provost (2002) and was adapted to reflect current threats on the Israeli population.

Willingness to compromise for peace was measured using a single item, as in Study 2: "What is your opinion about a peace settlement with the Palestinians in return for withdrawing to the 1967 borders with some border adjustments?" Answers ranged from 1 (*strongly oppose*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). *Political militancy.* In the current study, we used a general measure of political militancy that was a composite of the following four items, based on Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos (2002), Nelson and Milburn, (1999) and McAlister, Bandura, and Owen (2006): "In times of threat to Israel, it is important to take significant military actions, even if it means harming innocents on the opposing side"; "In times of threat to Israel we should support even unconventional warfare"; "In times of threat to Israel, it is necessary that we overpower the enemy or destroy it"; and "Only by using force can you achieve anything in the Middle East." The answers ranged from 1 (*strongly oppose*) to 6 (*strongly agree*) ($\alpha = 0.71$).

Sociodemographic variables. Participants were asked questions about their sociodemographic status and their political orientation that included items such as: age (in years), gender, education level, and political orientation (assessed using the standard self-report item measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*extreme right*), 2 (*right*), 3 (*right-center*), 4 (*center*), 5 (*left*), 6 (*left-center*) and 7 (*extreme left*).

Results and Discussion

Descriptive Statistics. To examine whether there were significant demographic and political differences between the groups, we created standardized scores for all variables to account for the fact that not all questions used the same scale. A series of independent samples *t*-tests indicated that there were no significant differences between the Holocaust group and the non-Holocaust group on most of the research variables (see Table 1). There were significant differences between the groups in political orientation, such that those in the Holocaust group were significantly more left-wing in political orientation than those in the non-Holocaust group [$\chi^2(2) = 21.85$, $p < 0.001$]. This may seem surprising given our claim that the Holocaust radicalizes political attitudes. However, as would be expected, the Holocaust group included more Ashkenazi (i.e., European-Jewish) participants than the non-

Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and F-tests for Sociodemographic Variables of the Holocaust Groups

	Holocaust Group	N	M	SD	t/x^2	p
Gender (male)	Yes	327	.49	.50	.009	ns
	No	540	.50	.50		
Age	Yes	322	45.27	16.87	.61	ns
	No	533	44.57	15.69		
Education (Academic)	Yes	327	.33	.47	1.38	ns
	No	540	.29	.45		
Ethnicity (Ashkenazi)	Yes	255	.85	.36	183.67	<.001
	No	428	.32	.46		
Political orientation	Yes	296	3.63	1.41	21.85	<.001
	No	474	3.29	1.26		
Exposure to political violence	Yes	327	.43	.49	1.73	ns
	No	540	.38	.48		
Perceived threat	Yes	324	2.96	.92	.41	ns
	No	540	2.93	.97		
Political militancy	Yes	323	3.99	1.23	−1.17	ns
	No	539	4.08	1.13		
Willingness to compromise	Yes	312	3.08	1.80	1.79	ns
	No	512	2.85	1.76		

Holocaust group [$\chi^2(1) = 183.67$, $p < 0.001$], and Ashkenazi Israelis generally hold more politically liberal attitudes than their Sephardic counterparts (Shamir & Arian, 1999). We predicted that in spite of being more liberal, people in the Holocaust group would exhibit more radicalized attitudes if they were exposed to contemporary political violence.

Next, we examined intercorrelations between the research variables separately for the Holocaust and non-Holocaust groups and conducted Fisher's Z tests to examine differences in the magnitude of these associations (Z values above 1.96 or below −1.96 are significant at $p = .05$). As shown in Table 2, political orientation was correlated with political outcomes (militancy and willingness to compromise) in both groups. Specifically, the more right-wing the political attitude, the lower the willingness to compromise [Fisher's $Z = .37$], and the higher the support for violent solutions (Fisher's $Z = −.91$). Furthermore, political outcomes were correlated with each other, such that the higher the support for violent solutions (militancy), the lower the willingness to compromise (Fisher's $Z = −1.06$).

Main Analysis. In this section, we estimated a moderated-mediation model in which we examined our main hypotheses that (1) the relationships between exposure to contemporary political violence and political attitudes are mediated by perceived existential threat and (2) that the Holocaust group differs from the non-Holocaust group in these mediated paths. To this end, we conducted a moderated-mediation analysis by using Hayes's (2013) PROCESS (model 58—a moderated mediation model) in which exposure to contemporary political violence served as the predictor, perceived existential threat served as the mediator, political attitudes (militancy and willingness to compromise for peace) served as the outcome measures, and Holocaust group (0.5 = Holocaust, $−0.5$ = non-Holocaust) served as the moderator. To avoid multicollinearity, we centered the measures of exposure to contemporary political violence and perceived existential threat around their sample mean. The significance of the moderated-mediation paths were estimated using bias-corrected bootstrap analyses with 5,000 resampling. Results are summarized in Figure 4.

The model indicated that the greater the exposure to contemporary political violence, the greater the perceived existential threat, $b = 0.08$, $SE = 0.04$, $t_{(865)} = 2.21$, $p = .028$. This link was not moderated by Holocaust group classification, $b = 0.05$, $SE = 0.07$, $t_{(865)} = 0.63$, $p = .532$, which indicates that it was equally true for both Holocaust and non-Holocaust groups.

Table 2. Correlations Among Research Variables (non-Holocaust: upper line; Holocaust: lower line)

|	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Gender (male)	1							
2. Age	.024							
	.052							
3. Education (academic)	−.006	.05						
	.028	.088						
4. Ethnicity (Ashkenazi)	.06	.02	.233**					
	.105	.100	.151*					
5. Political orientation	−.01	.22**	.22**	.14**				
	.011	.071	.191**	.194**				
6. Exposure to political violence	.14**	−.002	−.005	−.069	−.08			
	.077	−.036	.055	−.157*	−.185**			
7. Perceived political threat	−.22**	−.037	−.11*	−.049	−.14**	.12**		
	−.148**	.075	−.056**	−.053	−.127*	.123*		
8. Political militancy	.21**	−.04	−.10*	−.08	−.44**	.01	.081	
	.149**	.02	−.154**	−.063	−.498**	.080	.154**	
9. Willingness to compromise	−.018	.19**	.21**	.032	.47**	−.05	−.09*	−.293**
	.052	.166**	.135*	.096	.496**	−.091	−.222**	−.431**

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

The associations between perceived existential threat and political attitudes, however, [militancy ($b = 0.14$, $SE = 0.04$, $t_{(865)} = 3.93$, $p < .001$) and willingness to compromise for peace ($b = −0.19$, $SE = 0.04$, $t_{(865)} = −4.94$, $p < .001$)] were dependent on Holocaust group classification (i.e., significant interactions; $b = 0.14$, $SE = 0.07$, $t_{(865)} = 1.97$, $p = .049$ for militancy, $b = −0.15$, $SE = 0.08$, $t_{(865)} = −2.05$, $p = .040$ for willingness to compromise for peace). Greater perceived existential threat was more strongly linked with higher militancy and lower willingness to compromise for peace among the Holocaust group [militancy ($b = 0.22$, $SE = 0.06$, $t_{(865)} = 3.57$, $p < .001$) and willingness to compromise for peace ($b = −0.27$, $SE = 0.06$, $t_{(865)} = −4.27$, $p < .001$)] than among the non-Holocaust group [militancy ($b = 0.07$, $SE = 0.04$, $t_{(865)} = 1.75$, $p = .080$; marginally significant) and willingness to compromise for peace ($b = −0.11$, $SE = 0.04$, $t_{(865)} = −2.52$, $p = .012$)].

Bias-corrected bootstrap analyses indicated that the mediation paths from exposure to contemporary political violence via perceived existential threat to political attitudes (militancy and willingness to compromise for peace) were, as predicted, significant only among the Holocaust group [militancy (95% CI .002, .04) and willingness to compromise for peace (95% CI −.04, −.01)] and not among the non-Holocaust group [militancy (95% CI −.004, .02) and willingness to compromise for peace (95% CI .002, −.02)]. The moderated-mediation index (Hayes, 2015) indicated that the differences between the Holocaust groups in the magnitude of these mediation paths were significant (95% CI .001, .04 for militancy, and 95% CI −.04, −.001 for willingness to compromise for peace).

Next, we examined whether we attain similar results in three conditions: (1) when controlling for the effects of age, gender, level of education, place of origin, and political orientation; (2) when omitting the 25 Holocaust survivors from the analyses; and (3) when coding exposure to contemporary political violence as a binary measure (0 = *no exposure*, 1 = *exposure*). The analyses indicated that whereas controlling for the effects of age, gender, level of education, place of origin, and political orientation, and coding exposure to contemporary political violence as a binary measure did not change the results, omitting the 25 Holocaust survivors from the analyses slightly affected the results. Specifically, we found that after omitting the 25 Holocaust survivors from the analyses, Holocaust group classification no longer moderated the link between perceived political threat and militancy ($b = 0.11$, $SE = 0.07$, $t_{(865)} = 1.44$, $p = .15$), indicating that greater perceived political threat was linked with greater militancy for both the

Figure 4. Moderated-mediation analysis linking exposure to political violence via perceived existential threat to political attitudes as a function of Holocaust group classification. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Holocaust and non-Holocaust groups. The results for willingness to compromise for peace did not significantly change. These results provide only partial support for our hypotheses and indicate the importance of including actual Holocaust survivors to obtain the effects. It could be that these effects become diluted over time from generation to generation. If this explanation is correct, then we should expect Holocaust descendancy to cease to have an effect in the future.

The results of Study 4 reveal the ubiquitous effect of the Holocaust on the mindset of Israeli Jews and indicates, on a large-scale representative sample, that not only incidental reminders of the Holocaust spark Holocaust-related processing of political information. For Holocaust survivors, their children, and their grandchildren, the Holocaust is the prism through which they comprehend and interpret current political affairs. The results of Study 4 reveal the association between reminders of the Holocaust and the mindset of Israeli Jews and indicates, on a large-scale representative sample, that not only do incidental reminders of the Holocaust spark Holocaust-related processing of political information, as the first two experiments suggest, for Holocaust survivors, their children, and their grandchildren, the Holocaust is an important prism through which they comprehend and interpret current political affairs. Study 4 contributes to the first three studies by demonstrating the chronic effects of the Holocaust but does not measure ideological identification as was done in the other studies. This limitation precludes an understanding of the chronic role of ideology as a mediator between chronic collective trauma and political attitudes and does not enable us to test the hypothesized relationship between ideological identification and perceptions of existential threat. Future research should directly examine these questions.

General Discussion

The current research constitutes a comprehensive investigation of the effects of the Holocaust on the political cognitions of contemporary Israeli Jews vis-à-vis the conflicts Israel is currently involved in—conflicts that are not directly related to the events of the Holocaust. The research begins in a laboratory setting, gradually progresses out of the lab into real-life reminders of the Holocaust, and culminates in revealing the chronic effects of the Holocaust on the Israeli-Jewish population.

The results of the four studies clearly indicate that the memory of the Holocaust still produces considerable effects on political attitudes towards peace and conflict, not just as a distant vague memory of a past collective trauma, but as a prism through which Israeli-Jews understand contemporary political dynamics. Specifically, the first two experiments establish a causal link between experimentally manipulated Holocaust reminders and belligerent political attitudes. Furthermore, the results of Studies 1 and 2 indicate that the effects of Holocaust reminders on political attitudes are mediated by levels of ideological identification (i.e., Zionism).

This link between the memory of trauma and political militancy may lead to the erroneous conclusion that as long as a people dwell on their past grievances, there is no chance for a peaceful resolution of contemporary conflict. The findings of Study 2 are consistent with other research (e.g., Wohl & Branscombe, 2005) suggesting that framing the Holocaust as an exclusive crime against the Jewish people increases levels of ideological identification, which then amplifies militancy and reduces support for political compromise. However, when this collective traumatic memory is reframed inclusively as a crime against humanity and not confined to ingroup members victimized by a specific enemy, but as pain that is shared by many others, the trauma can be remembered without the enhancement of ingroup-specific loyalty and without having a toxic effect on the resolution of contemporary intergroup conflict.

Study 3 conducted around Holocaust Remembrance Day supports the results of the aforementioned studies by showing that Holocaust salience that is not manipulated, but is observed in the community and is defined as high exposure to the Holocaust on Remembrance Day, is associated with increased support for intergroup violence mediated by higher levels of ideological identification. Thus, the findings of this study further validate the findings of the two experiments and indicate that the effects of the Holocaust on ideological identification and militancy occur in real-life settings.

The findings of the nationally representative survey in Study 4 add to this picture by showing that Holocaust survivors and their descendants process contemporary political conflict differently than others. For them, exposure to political violence is not only associated with an increase in threat perceptions, but these elevated perceptions are associated with increased support for violent solutions to current conflict and reduced willingness to compromise for peace. Although Study 4 is substantially different from the other three studies and looks at how exposure to political violence is related to political attitudes among Holocaust descendants and nondescendants, this study takes the effects of Holocaust salience from the lab and from brief momentary real-world reminders of the Holocaust to the chronic effects of the Holocaust on political attitudes in daily life. In this respect, Study 4 is a vital component of the current research as it establishes our contention that the memory of the Holocaust radicalizes political attitudes in Israel on an ongoing chronic basis. Previous research has already indicated that the offspring of Holocaust survivors are particularly sensitive to collective existential threats (Shrira, 2015). The current research adds to this picture by indicating that this population also shows increased political belligerence and decreased willingness to make compromises for peace when confronted with current political violence.

The results of Study 4 are also consistent with the idea that extreme environmental stress influences political attitudes (Canetti-Nisim, Arieli, & Halperin, 2008; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, & Johnson, 2006) and converge with a new stress-based model of political extremism that shows that the relationship between exposure to political violence and radicalized political attitudes is mediated by higher

levels of threat perceptions (Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009). It is notable that in the current research this model is supported in the Holocaust group and primarily by the 25 direct Holocaust survivors that when removed weaken the results.

Another important difference between Study 4 and the other studies is that in the first three studies ideological identification served as the mediator to help understand why Holocaust salience radicalizes political attitudes. In Study 4, we used a different mediator, perceptions of existential threat, to explain why exposure to violence radicalizes political attitudes among Holocaust survivors and their descendants. Because existential threat plays a pivotal role in Zionist ideology (Yair, 2015) and is frequently trumpeted by Israeli leaders to coax the public to support their policies, the results of Study 4 can be seen as complimenting the results of the first three studies. It may even be that existential threat is the active ingredient that is responsive to Holocaust salience and is driving the effects of ideological identification in the first three studies. Although this explanation follows the logic of our argument and is supported by previous research, the current research did not examine the relationship between existential threat and ideological identification, and we can, therefore, not draw any definite conclusions about the relationship between these constructs on the basis of this research.

Taken together, all four studies yield results that provide a complex and comprehensive perspective on the Holocaustization of political attitudes among Israeli Jews. Although these studies differ in nature (experimental, observational), together they address the limitations that any single approach would have. Studies 1 and 2, in which Holocaust exposure was an experimentally manipulated independent variable, demonstrate that reminders of the Holocaust have a causal effect on political attitudes. The observational study conducted around Holocaust Remembrance Day (Study 3) shows that the findings of the experiments extend to real-life reminders of the Holocaust, and by doing so provides ecological validity to our predictions. The large-scale survey (Study 4) adds additional external validity to this research by drawing on a large, diverse, representative sample that provides data consistent with the findings of the experiments and attests to the on-going chronic effect of the Holocaust on Israeli society.

The *Holocaustization* of political attitudes revealed in this research may reflect a more universal effect of *traumatization of political attitudes*, in which a group's past trauma and collective victimization is maintained in collective memory, transmitted to new generations, and becomes the catalyst of creating and maintaining identification and affiliation with the group. Research is needed to assess the extent to which the findings of the present studies regarding Israeli Jews' responses to living in the shadow of the Holocaust generalize to survivors of other instances of genocide and political violence.

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