'Pinkwashing' the radical-right: Gender and the mainstreaming of radical-right policies and actions

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Abstract. Across the globe, women are increasingly more visible as leaders and activists in radical-right parties and movements. Does women's visibility in radical-right politics, both institutionalized and non-institutionalized, affect public acceptance of radical-right agendas? The present paper proposes a 'radical-right gender mainstreaming model', arguing that women in radical-right politics are perceived by the general public through a prism of feminine gender stereotypes, which counteract radical-right parties' and movements' masculine stereotypes, thus 'softening' their image and making them more acceptable to the general public. Across four experimental studies conducted in the Israeli context, we find strong evidence that women's visibility as radical-right parliamentary representatives (Studies 1a and 1b) and as radical-right political activists (Studies 2a and 2b) increases acceptance of and support for these parties' and movements' agenda, particularly among women. We further demonstrate that these effects are mediated by the attribution of feminine stereotypes (warmth) to women versus men political actors. Implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords: gender; radical-right; stereotypes; Israel

Historically, radical-right parties[1] across the world have had relatively few women representatives, a gender gap among their supporters and electorate and most if not all of them have been identified with a distinctly masculinist and militant public image (Banerjee 2012; De Lange & Mügge 2015; Harteveld & Ivarsflaten 2018; Miller-Idriss & Pilkington 2019; Mudde 2019). Yet women, though still in smaller numbers than men, have been increasingly more visible in radical-right politics in various countries. Marine Le Pen in France, Siv Jensen in Norway, Pragya Thakur in India and Ayelet Shaked in Israel, are just a few examples of high-profile women leaders in the global radical-right tide.

Even more than in formal politics, women's visibility on the radical-right is pronounced in informal, grassroots movement activism (Bacchetta & Power 2013; Blee 2017; McRae 2018). The informal arena is central to many radical-right parties, who are often connected to movements that mobilize supporters on the ground. One prominent example is the radical-right Israeli settler movement, where women have played a significant role in grassroots activism, which has only recently been translated to more significant representation in formal politics (Ben Shitrit 2015).

But what is the effect of the inclusion and visibility of women in radical-right politics? This research examines how the visibility of women as political actors (elected representatives, political activists) on the radical-right affects these parties and movements' acceptance by the political mainstream. We argue that a gender lens could help explain some of the contemporary success of such movements and parties to move from the extreme margins to more central positions in

national politics, shedding light on the role that women's visibility and gender stereotypes play in the 'mainstreaming' of radical-right politics.

We propose a 'radical-right gender mainstreaming model'[2] which departs from the common use of the term. Traditionally, 'gender mainstreaming' refers to making a gender perspective, analysis and women's representation central rather than peripheral so that gender equality becomes a mainstream objective. Radical-right gender mainstreaming, on the other hand, signifies a very different process. We argue that through increased and more visible women's participation and representation, radical-right movements or parties make radical agendas seem more 'mainstream' and acceptable to the general public; this without changing their core nativist and authoritarian agendas.

We propose that the mechanism explaining this mainstreaming effect is the way in which gender stereotypes intersect with political ideology. We hypothesize that women in radical-right politics are perceived by the general public through a prism of feminine gender stereotypes, which counteract the masculine image people already hold about radical-right parties and movements. The effect of these two countervailing cues, we contend, would be beneficial to radical-right (but not radical-left) parties and movements, 'softening' their image and hence making them more acceptable to the general public. We contend that this mechanism may ultimately help radical-right parties reduce their voting gender gap, whereby women tend to vote in smaller numbers to such parties in comparison to men. In addition, it helps radical-right movements recruit more women activists to participate in its actions and 'mainstream' the perception of these movements' actions among the general public.

The current research tests these propositions in two sets of survey experiments conducted in Israel, one concerning institutionalized radical-right politics (parliamentary politics) and the other non-institutional radical-right politics (activism). The first set of studies (1a and 1b) examines the effect of political candidates' gender (manipulated: man/woman) on citizens' attitudes toward a radical-right (Study 1a) or radical-left (Study 1b) policy and party they represent. The second set of studies (2a and 2b) examines the effect of the gender (manipulated: man/woman) of an activist involved in radical-right (Study 2a) or radical-left (Study 2b) action on respondents' attitudes toward the action and movement. Finally, we examined the application of feminine stereotypes (*warmth*) to the woman candidate or activist as a potential mechanism underlying the effects of the candidate's/activist's gender on support for the policy/action presented.

The radical-right gender gap

Women are significantly underrepresented among the radical-right electorate compared to men in many different countries (Coffé 2018; Deshpande 2009; Harteveld et al. 2015; Spierings & Zaslove 2017). This phenomenon has been termed the Radical-Right Gender Gap (RRGG). Although the size of this gap varies over time and across specific countries, it remains relatively persistent, particularly in Europe (de Bruijn & Veenbrink 2012; Givens 2004; Immerzeel et al. 2015; Norris 2005). This RRGG seems to preoccupy leaders of radical-right movements, who recognize that they have to attract more women (Chrisafis et al. 2019). Indeed, according to a recent study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) which examines right-wing voters in Germany, France, Greece, Poland, Sweden and Hungary, many radical-right-wing parties now place particular emphasis on garnering women's votes (Gutsche 2018).

Despite the extant research demonstrating a RRGG, the sources of this gap remain unclear. One possibility could be a gender gap in *attitudes* toward the positions and policies associated with the radical-right, such as anti-minority policies, nativist nationalism, or anti-liberal authoritarianism. Yet, as Harteveld et al. (2015: 103) conclude from their sample of voters in 17 Western and Eastern European countries: 'women generally do not differ from men in their level of nativism, authoritarianism or discontent with democracy. Among women, however, these attitudes are less strongly related to a radical-right vote. This suggests that men consider the issues of the radical-right to be more salient, but also that these parties deter women for reasons other than the content of their political program'. In the case of Israel, previous research has shown that women often do not differ from men in their support for positions associated with the radical-right. For example, women were found to be as hawkish as men in their positions on security and foreign affairs issues (Shamir & Gedalya-Lavy 2015), and as more supportive than men of social exclusion and marginalization of minority out-groups (Ben Shitrit et al. 2017).

If it is not necessarily the ideological positions of radical-right parties – that is their nativism, anti-minority and anti-liberal authoritarianism – that deter women from supporting and voting for them, why is there a RRGG? One hypothesized, yet under-researched explanation for this gap is that it lies, at least in part, in the *gendered image* of the radical-right (Ralph-Morrow 2020). Research on party stereotypes has shown that right-wing parties are often portrayed in the media, and are identified by the public, with certain masculine stereotypes (tough, authoritarian, aggressive/assertive, concerned with 'hard' issues etc.), while left-leaning parties are more associated with feminine stereotypes (soft, compassionate, welfarist, concerned with 'social' issues, etc.) (Köttig et al. 2017; Rashkova & Zankina 2017; Winter 2010). This masculine image is even more pronounced in the case of radical-right parties. In the European context, Mudde (2007) has called radical-right parties 'Männerparteien' or men's parties, capturing their association with men as activists, voters, politicians and a masculinist agenda and public image. The role of masculinity in the radical-right has been noted in studies spanning the United States, India, Israel, Europe and elsewhere (Banerjee 2012; Blee 2017; Engelberg 2017; Gökarıksel et al. 2019).

This paper argues that including more women in visible positions in radical-right parties and movements helps address the gendered image of these parties and could consequently reduce the gender gap in support for radical-right politics and actions. The purpose of this research is to examine whether women's visibility in radical-right parties and movements increases women's support for their agendas via changes to their gendered image, rather than to prove that the RRGG stems exclusively from the gendered image of the radical-right. Nevertheless, support for our hypotheses will also provide initial support for the relation between the gendered image of the radical-right and the RRGG. The next section outlines the theory we propose and test in this research.

The role of gender stereotypes in mainstreaming the radical-right

We propose that women will find radical-right parties and movements less repellent when represented by a woman (vs. man) political actor, and that this effect is explained by feminine gender stereotypes which soften the masculinist image of such parties and movements.

There is a vast literature identifying the various gender stereotypes and gendered frames employed to assess women in general, and women politicians in particular, both in media coverage

and in voters' evaluation. Stereotypes about gender, like many other social categories, often entail two fundamental dimensions: perceived *warmth* (compassion, honesty, likeability) and perceived *competence* (skilfulness, ability, intelligence), with warmth typically perceived as 'feminine' and competence as 'masculine' (Fiske 2010). Similar stereotypes apply to women politicians, who are perceived as less experienced, less qualified and weaker on 'hard' policy issues like foreign affairs, defence, crime and immigration, but better on 'soft' issues like welfare policy and education compared to men (For a few examples see: Barnes & Beaulieu 2014; Bauer 2015; Dolan 2014; Huddy & Terkildsen 1993; Koch 2000, 2002; McDermott 1997; Sanbonmatsu 2002). While much of the literature on gender stereotypes towards women in politics is drawn from the United States and Europe, there is a growing recent examination of such patterns in non-Western contexts, including, among others, India, Tunisia, Turkey and Israel (Benstead et al. 2015; Guha 2018; Halevi 2012; Matland & Tezcür 2011). Such stereotypes are also reflected in media representations of women activists in radical political movements. Whether portrayals are sympathetic or unsympathetic to women activists, they often share in the idea that women's actions are motivated by personal, often emotional, reasons as compared to the cold and political motivations driving men activists (Gardner 2007; Lavie-Dinur et al. 2015; Nacos 2005; McManus 2013; Sjoberg & Gentry 2011; Yarchi 2014).

Recent research has also shown that when gender stereotypes towards a politician run counter to the gender stereotypes associated with her party, such a contradiction may have a positive effect for the politician herself (Hayes 2011; Koch 2000, 2001; Mayer 2013; Snipes & Mudde 2019). We argue that such a contradiction is particularly beneficial for radical-right parties and movements. These could make radical-right *agendas and policies* appear more acceptable to the general public, as the feminine stereotypes applied to a radical-right woman counter the authoritarian, hard-line and aggressive image of radical-right politics.

However, this gender mainstreaming effect, we hypothesize, will not work in the case of radical-left politics, for two reasons: First, in the context we study here – Israel – contemporary radical-left parties are generally perceived as less authoritarian, more liberal-democratic (advocating protections of civil and political rights and minorities' rights against majoritarian dominance) and 'softer' on issues of security and foreign policy.[3] As the Israeli radical-left is not associated with masculine stereotypes, women actors in radical-left parties and movements will not provide a counterstereotype to the party image. Second, women in leftist politics and activism represent a norm rather than an anomaly or a more recent phenomenon (CAWP 2017; Devroe & Wauters 2018), and thus an actor's gender would likely be a less salient issue in determining public support for radical-left policies and actions. We therefore do not expect the visibility of women to create a mainstreaming effect in the radical-left case.

Furthermore, we hypothesize that the gender mainstreaming effect should work particularly well among women. We hypothesize that because women may be more cognizant of, and deterred by, the radical-right's masculinist image (Ralph-Morrow 2020), the counterstereotypes presented by a woman politician or activist on the radical-right should have a greater effect on women, compared to men. However, we argue that this is not simply a gender affinity effect (Dolan 2008; Goodyear-Grant & Croskill 2011) whereby women are simply more likely to support women in politics. Rather, it is the intersection of the countervailing gender stereotypes applied to a political actor *and* the stereotypical applied to her political party that generates the mainstreaming effect on radical politics. If indeed we find that in the radical-left case the presence of a woman actor does

not change women respondents' attitudes, this will further support our argument that the effect is not merely caused by homophily.

The Israeli context

The political stream most representative of the radical-right agenda in Israel is the Jewish settler movement and its affiliated political parties. The movement's goal is to settle throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territories in order to prevent Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state. It has a nativist, Jewish supremacist agenda and views liberal institutions, such as the Supreme Court, and human rights organizations, as a hindrance to Jewish majoritarian supremacy (Pedahzur 2012; Zertal & Eldar 2009). While they have certain characteristics that make them unique to Israel, such as religious nationalism and preoccupation with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, parties on the Israeli radical-right have been identified as similar to other radical-right parties in Europe, the United States and India, among others – particularly in their emphasis on nativist ethno-nationalism and authoritarian majoritarianism in discourse, activism and legislation efforts (Elad-Strenger et al. 2013; Hirsch-Hoefler & Mudde 2020; Mudde 2019; Perliger & Pedahzur 2018). In fact, Hirsch-Hoefler and Mudde (2020) conclude that studying the Israeli radical-right provides highly useful insights to the study and theorizing of radical-right politics in Europe.

Since the 1970s, women have been consistently under-represented in these radical right parties, in comparison with left-wing parties. Until 1992, radical-right parties had only one woman Member of Knesset (Israeli parliament), and in 1992–2003 there were none. But this trend has begun to change in recent years. By 2013–2015, there were three women MKs in radical-right parties, representing 23 per cent of their parliamentary seats. Even more significantly, inclusion of women in the top-10 places in these parties' election tickets has seen a stark uptick from 10 per cent of spots in 2003 to 50 per cent in 2020. In the September 2019 election, the radical-right party Yamina ('Rightward') was the only list in parliament headed by a woman. In the subsequent 2020 election, the union of the radical-right settler parties, running in a joint list, included five women in its first 10 places; more than any other list running for parliament.[4]

'Feminizing' the image of the radical-right has been an explicit strategy of some settler movements at least since the mid-1990s. Feige (2009) has written about the settlers' efforts to 'settle in the hearts' of mainstream Israeli public opinion. As he and others (Ben Shitrit 2015; Neuman 2004) have argued, the movement has tried to 'domesticate' the image of the settlement enterprise in the occupied Palestinian territories by highlighting the participation of women in this project. That the Israeli radical-right believes a gender mainstreaming model may be effective is evident, but does this strategy actually work? Could it really help radical-right movements and parties make their positions more acceptable to the general public?

The current studies

The first set of studies (1a and 1b) examine the effect of political candidates' gender on citizens' attitudes toward a radical-right (Study 1a) or radical-left (Study 1b) policy and party they represent. The second set of studies (2a and 2b) tests our 'gender mainstreaming model' on the level of movement activism rather than formal politics. In these studies, we examine the effect of the gender

Figure 1. Hypothesized model explaining the effects of the candidate's gender on women respondents' attitudes toward radical-right/left policy agenda, via 'warmth' stereotypes (Studies 1a and 1b)

Figure 2. Hypothesized model explaining the effects of the activist's gender on women respondents' attitudes toward radical-right/left action, via 'warmth' stereotypes (Studies 2a and 2b)

of an activist involved in radical-right (Study 2a) or radical-left (Study 2b) action (political protest) on respondents' attitudes toward the action and movement.

In both sets of studies, we hypothesized that when presented with a radical-right action or policy proposal by a woman (vs. man) actor, women respondents will be more supportive of the policy (Study 1a) or the action (Studies 2a). The mechanism mediating these effects, we hypothesized, is the application of feminine stereotypes (*warmth*) to the woman actor. Based on the theory reviewed above, we assume that such stereotypes counteract the 'hard' and 'masculine' image of her radical-right party and its policies. Finally, we hypothesized that the gender of the actor will not affect support for a radical-left policy (Study 2a) or action (Study 2b).

Our research model is presented in Figures 1 and 2.

Alongside warmth stereotypes, we also examine the attribution of competence stereotypes as an alternative mediator in the relation between the candidate's gender and support for the policy and party or action and activist movement. As the literature suggests that professional women are stereotypically perceived as highly competent and cold, as opposed to women in 'traditional' roles (Fiske 2010), we wanted to rule out the possibility that attribution of typical masculine stereotypes to woman (vs. men) candidates drives the effects rather than the attribution of typical feminine stereotypes.

Studies 1a and 1b

Studies 1a and 1b examine the gender mainstreaming model in the context of radical policies promoted by parliamentary candidates. Specifically, we investigated whether radical-right (Study 1a) and radical-left (Study 1b) policies and parties are perceived differently by the public as a

function of a candidate's gender (man/woman). We hypothesized that women respondents in the treatment condition (woman candidate) will find the policy and party less objectionable than in the control condition (man candidate), when the candidate represents a radical-right ideology (Study 1a; *H1a*), but not a radical-left ideology (Study 1b; *H1b*). We further hypothesized that the effect of the candidate's gender on support for the radical-right policy and party will be mediated by feminine stereotypes, such that the radical-right woman candidate will be perceived as warmer than the radical-right man candidate, and that the attribution of warmth will in turn increase support for the radical-right policy and party (Study 1a; *H2*).

Sample

Participants in Study 1a (radical-right candidate) were 501 Jewish-Israelis (32% rightists, 34% centrists, 34.5% leftists; 55.5% women and 44.5% men;[5] age 18–81; Mage[SD] = 43.72 [15.51]). Participants in Study 1b (radical-left candidate) were 498 Jewish-Israelis (35% rightists, 33% centrists, 32% leftists; 56% women and 44% men; age 18–86; Mage[SD] = 43.89 [15.53]). Sample sizes were based on power analyses using G*Power (Faul et al. 2009) for detecting a medium-sized effect (0.25) in an ANOVA, based on standard alpha (0.05) and power (80 per cent).

Participants in both studies were recruited online via a professional survey company (Panel4All), which specializes in online studies and offers a pool of around 100,000 Israeli panelists, to allow for representative sampling of the Israeli society according to various criteria. The company provides monetary compensation to panelists for their participation in every study. In the recruitment of participants for our studies, we set quotas on the political orientation item (1 = right, 7 = left) before data collection to ensure a balanced sample in terms of political orientation in all samples. Participants were provided with a link to the online questionnaire, which was constructed using Qualtrics software.

Procedure and measures

Participants first completed a demographics questionnaire (age, gender [0 = man, 1 = woman, 2 = other], level of religiosity, income, education, political orientation [1 = right, 7 = left]) and were then randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. Across conditions, participants read a fictitious Facebook post by an anonymous parliamentary candidate advocating a radical-right policy (Study 1a: 'the Israeli Supreme Court should not be allowed to strike down Knesset legislation') or a radical-left policy (Study 1b: 'the Israeli Supreme Court should be allowed to strike down Knesset legislation'). The contents of these posts were pre-tested to ensure that they both represent radical-right-wing or left-wing policies that are matched in terms of extremity (see Supporting Information Appendix for pre-test and full content of the Facebook posts). While the radical-left statement may seem like a mainstream liberal democratic tenet, it was marked by Israeli respondents in our pre-test as being located on the far-left. Conversely, stripping the Supreme Court of its current powers was marked by respondents as located on the far-right. In the past several election cycles in Israel, limiting the powers of the Court and removing checks on the executive has been one of the most salient radical-right policy agendas that has characterized its tendency toward authoritarian executive aggrandizement.[6] Limiting or otherwise controlling the courts by various means has been a radical-right strategy in other countries as well and is one

Table 1. Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations between the main study variables (Study 1a)

M	SD	1	2	3
1. Participant's gender (woman)	0.55	0.50	1		
2. Participant's political orientation (left)	3.94	1.37	0.10[*]	1	
3. Support for radical-right policy	3.57	2.27	−0.12[**]	−0.57[***]	1

Note. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 (two-tailed significance).

Table 2. Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations between the main study variables (Study 1b)

M	SD	1	2	3
4. Participant's gender (woman)	0.56	0.50	1		
5. Participant's political orientation (left)	3.82	1.41	0.15[**]	1	
6. Support for radical-left policy	4.84	2.19	0.06	0.53[***]	1

Note. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01 (two-tailed significance).

feature, among others, of the authoritarian tendencies of some radical-right actors (Bugarič 2019; Laurent & Scheppele 2017; Matczak 2020).

In both studies, the post was supposedly written by either a woman or a man[7] parliamentary candidate, while concealing the candidate's name, profile picture and party affiliation to avoid any confounding information. All following questions relating to the candidate were framed in gender-appropriate terms, to further strengthen the gender manipulation.

After reading the post, participants rated the candidate on the same six traits related to *warmth* (likable, friendly, trustworthy) and *competence* (competent, intelligent, confident), rated on a 1–8 scale (see Cuddy et al. 2008; Study 1a: warmth: $\alpha = 0.86$; competence: $\alpha = 0.83$; Study 1b: warmth: $\alpha = 0.90$; competence: $\alpha = 0.85$).

Finally, participants rated their *support for the policy and party* on a scale ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 8 (= to a great extent): 'to what extent do you support the policy promoted by the candidate', 'to what extent do you think such positions should be represented in the Israeli parliament', 'to what extent would you agree that a party representing such views will be elected to the Israeli parliament', 'to what extent would you be willing to vote for the party representing this candidate'[8] (Study 1a: $\alpha = 0.94$, Study 1b: $\alpha = 0.95$).

Results and discussion

Preliminary analyses

Tables 1–2 show means, standard deviations and correlations between the main variables assessed in Studies 1a and 1b. Participants' gender and ideology were significantly but weakly correlated in both studies, such that women participants were more left-wing than men participants. Participants' gender was weakly correlated with support for the radical-right policy, such that women participants were less supportive of this policy compared to men (Study 1a). Participants' gender was not correlated with support for the radical-left policy (Study 1b). Left-wing orientation

was negatively associated with support for a radical-right policy (Study 1a) and positively associated with support for the radical-left policy (Study 1b). Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations between the studies' variables within each experimental condition can be found in the Supporting Information Appendix.

*The effects of the candidate's gender on support for policy and party (*H1a, H1b*)*

To examine *H1a* and *H1b*, we conducted two univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs), one for each study, with gender of candidate (woman/man), participants' gender (woman/man) and participants' political orientation (right/centre/left) as predictors, and support for the policy and party as the dependent variable. Results are presented in Table 3.

In Study 1a (radical-right policy), the analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction involving the candidate's gender and participants' gender on support for the policy, which was not qualified by participants' political orientation[9]. Among women participants, support for the radical-right policy was significantly higher under the woman candidate condition (M = 3.94, SD = 0.190) compared to a man candidate condition (M = 3.08, SD = 0.198, p = 0.002), while among men participants, there were no significant differences in support for the woman (M = 3.64, SD = 0.225) versus man candidate (M = 3.92, SD = 0.214, p = 0.376). Similar effects were obtained when controlling for other demographics (age, income, education, level of religiosity).

In Study 1b (radical-left policy), the candidate's gender had no significant effect on support for the policy, nor did the candidate's gender interact with participants' gender or political orientation to predict support for the policy. Similar effects were obtained when controlling for other demographics (age, income, education, level of religiosity).

To conclude, consistent with our hypotheses, findings indicate that women (but *not* men) participants demonstrated higher support for a radical-right policy and party (Study 1a, *H1a*), but not a radical-left policy and party (Study 1b, *H1b*), when it was represented by a woman candidate, compared to a man candidate.

*The mediating role of gender stereotypes (*H2*)*

As a first step to examine *H2*, we conducted four ANOVAs, two for each study, with gender of actor (woman/man), participants' gender (woman/man) and participants' political orientation (right/centre/left) as predictors, and warmth or competence (our hypothesized and alternative mediators) as the dependent variable. Results are presented in Table 4 (warmth attributions) and Table 5 (competence attributions).

In Study 1a (radical-right candidate), the candidate's gender interacted with participants' gender to predict attributions of warmth and competence attributions, such that the woman radical-right candidate was perceived as significantly more warm (M = 4.03, SD = 0.169) than the man radical-right candidate (M = 3.24, SD = 0.177, p = 0.001), and significantly more competent (M = 5.06, SD = 0.174) than the radical-right man candidate (M = 4.22, SD = 0.182, p = 0.001). Among men participants, the perceived warmth of the woman candidate (M = 3.65, SD = 0.201) did not differ from that of the man candidate (M = 3.92, SD = 0.190, p = 0.227), and the perceived competence of the woman candidate (M = 4.72, SD = 0.206) did not differ from that of the man candidate (M = 4.82, SD = 0.196, p = 0.730). These effects were not qualified by participants'

Table 3. ANOVA summary table for policy/action support (Studies 1a and 1b, Studies 2a and 2b)

df	Radical right policy (Study 1a)				Radical left policy (Study 1b)				Radical right action (Study 2a)				Radical left action (Study 2b)			
	df	MS	F	η_p^2	df	MS	F	η_p^2	df	MS	F	η_p^2	df	MS	F	η_p^2
Gender of actor (manipulated: woman/man)	1	6.96	1.98	0.01	1	7.34	2.08	0.01	1	11.27	4.26*	0.01	1	3.06	1.03	0.00
Participant's gender (woman/man)	1	5.99	1.71	0.01	1	1.09	0.31	0.00	1	20.52	7.75**	0.02	1	3.65	1.23	0.00
Participant's political orientation (left/centre/right)	2	275.43	78.54***	0.33	2	1970.94	33.82***	0.26	2	358.11	135.25***	0.46	2	159.02	53.47***	0.25
Gender of actor X participant's gender	1	26.25	7.48**	0.02	1	3.47	0.98	0.00	1	4.01	1.51	0.01	1	4.82	1.62	0.01
Gender of actor X participant's political orientation	2	1.09	0.31	0.00	2	3.71	1.05	0.01	2	2.12	0.80	0.01	2	1.95	0.65	0.00
participant's gender X participant's political orientation	2	2.90	0.83	0.01	2	11.70	3.30*	0.02	2	2.86	1.08	0.01	2	5.05	1.70	0.01
Gender of actor X participant's gender X participant's political orientation	2	.82	.23	.00	2	2.07	.58	.00	2	.06	.02	.00	2	7.62	2.56	.02
Within groups	324				321				323				327			
Total	336				333				335				339			

Note. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 (two-tailed significance). MS = Mean squares, η_p^2 = partial η squared.

Table 4. ANOVA summary table for warmth attributions (Studies 1a and 1b, Studies 2a and 2b)

	Radical right policy (Study 1a)				Radical left policy (Study 1b)				Radical right action (Study 2a)				Radical left action (Study 2b)			
	df	MS	F	η_p^2	df	MS	F	η_p^2	df	MS	F	η_p^2	df	MS	F	η_p^2
Gender of actor (manipulated: woman/man)	1	5.69	2.05	0.01	1	0.76	0.26	0.00	1	13.16	4.48*	0.01	1	1.17	0.41	0.00
Participant's gender (woman/man)	1	1.86	0.67	0.00	1	2.55	0.86	0.00	1	2.78	0.95	0.00	1	27.49	9.60**	0.03
Participant's political orientation (left/centre/right)	2	140.82	50.64***	0.24	2	98.39	33.14***	0.17	2	152.17	51.78***	0.24	2	120.43	42.05***	0.21
Gender of actor X participant's gender	1	22.93	8.25**	0.03	1	7.87	2.65	0.01	1	0.19	0.06	0.00	1	5.96	2.08	0.01
Gender of actor X participant's political orientation	2	0.21	0.07	0.00	2	2.08	0.70	0.00	2	4.86	1.65**	0.01	2	2.34	0.82	0.01
Participant's gender X participant's political orientation	2	0.55	0.20	0.00	2	5.55	1.87	0.01	2	15.81	5.38	0.03	2	1.12	0.39	0.00
Gender of actor X participant's gender X participant's political orientation	2	1.38	0.50	0.00	2	2.26	0.76	0.01	2	3.17	1.08	0.01	2	5.17	1.81	0.01
Within groups	324				321				323				327			
Total	336				333				335				339			

Note. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (two-tailed significance). MS = Mean squares, η_p^2 = partial η squared.

Table 5. ANOVA summary table for competence attributions (Studies 1a and 1b, Studies 2a and 2b)

	Radical right policy (Study 1a)				Radical left policy (Study 1b)				Radical right action (Study 2a)				Radical left action (Study 2b)			
	df	MS	F	η_p^2	df	MS	F	η_p^2	df	MS	F	η_p^2	df	MS	F	η_p^2
Gender of actor (manipulated: woman/man)	1	11.35	3.85	0.01	1	0.53	0.18	0.00	1	9.00	3.27	0.01	1	0.04	0.02	0.00
Participant's gender (woman/man)	1	1.34	0.45	0.00	1	4.09	1.37	0.00	1	17.05	6.20*	0.02	1	13.15	4.74*	0.01
Participant's political orientation (left/centre/right)	2	47.47	16.11***	0.09	2	46.07	15.48***	0.09	2	44.68	16.25***	0.09	2	116.66	42.01***	0.20
Gender of actor X participant's gender	1	18.14	6.16*	0.02	1	3.56	1.20	0.00	1	0.03	0.01	0.00	1	6.22	2.24	0.01
Gender of actor X participant's political orientation	2	0.73	0.25	0.00	2	2.76	0.93	0.01	2	4.05	1.47*	0.01	2	2.20	0.79	0.01
participant's gender X participant's political orientation	2	0.31	0.10	0.00	2	16.66	5.60**	0.03	2	12.39	4.51	0.03	2	2.52	0.91	0.01
Gender of actor X participant's gender X participant's political orientation	2	0.30	0.10	0.00	2	2.14	0.72	0.00	2	0.34	0.13	0.00	2	5.34	1.92	0.01
Within groups	324				321				323				327			
Total	336				333				335				339			

Note. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed significance). MS = Mean squares, η_p^2 = partial η squared.

political orientation. Similar effects were obtained when controlling for other demographics (age, income, education, level of religiosity).

In Study 1b (radical-left candidate), the candidate's gender did not have a significant effect on either warmth or competence attributions and did not interact with participants' gender or political orientation to predict perceived warmth and competence. Similar effects were obtained when controlling for other demographics (age, income, education, level of religiosity).

Having established the effect of the candidate's gender on women's support for a radical-right policy and party (Study 1a), we proceeded to examine whether this effect is mediated by gender stereotypes (warmth or competence). We used Hayes' (2017) PROCESS bootstrapping command with 5,000 iterations (Model 4), among women respondents, with the candidate's gender (0 = man, 1 = woman) set as the predictor, warmth attributions and competence attributions as simultaneous (competing) mediators, support for radical-right policy as the dependent variable, and participants' political orientation as covariate.

As hypothesized, the candidate's gender positively predicted warmth attributions (b = 0.76, SE = 0.24, β = 0.41, t = 3.20, p = 0.002, [CIb] = [0.29, 1.24) and competence attributions (b = 0.85 SE = 0.25, β = 0.47, t = 3.42, p = 0.001, [CIb] = [0.36, 1.33), indicating that participants attributed more warmth and competence to the woman politician compared to the man politician. The direct effect of the candidate's gender on support for the radical-right policy became non-significant after adding warmth and competence attributions to the model (b = 0.19, SE = 0.21, β = 0.09, t = 0.89, p = 0.375, [CIb] = [−0.23, 0.61]), and the effect of warmth attributions on support for the policy was significant (b = 0.53, SE = 0.03, β = 0.45, t = 11.18, p < 0.001, [CIb] = [0.44, 0.63]), whereas the effect of competence attributions was not (b = 0.53, SE = 0.03, β = 0.45, t = 11.18, p < 0.001, [CIb] = [0.44, 0.63]). Finally, in line with our mediation hypothesis, the indirect effect of the actor's gender on support for policy via warmth attributions was significant (b = 0.51, SE = 0.17, β = 0.27, [CIβ] = [0.11, 0.45]), whereas the indirect effect via competence attributions was not (b = 0.09, SE = 0.10, β = 0.04, [CIβ] = [−0.04, 0.14])[10]. Consistent with *H1b*, these findings indicate that warmth attributions, but not competence attributions, mediate the relations between the candidate's gender and support for radical-right policy, among women participants. These results are presented graphically in Figure 3.

To conclude, our findings support *H2*, suggesting that the effect of a candidate's gender on women's support for the radical-right policy and party was mediated by warmth attributions. Specifically, the radical-right woman candidate was perceived as warmer than the radical-right man candidate, and the warmth attributions in turn increased support for the policy and party. Importantly, the radical-right woman candidate was also perceived as more competent than the radical-right man candidate, consistent with previous findings suggesting that professional women are perceived as more competent than women in 'traditional' roles (Fiske 2010). However, as expected, the attribution of competence did not increase women's support for the policy and party, as this typical masculine stereotype does not counteract, or soften, the 'masculine' image of radical-right parties.

Studies 2a and 2b

Studies 2a and 2b examine the gender mainstreaming model in the context of political activism. We investigated whether radical-right (Study 2a) and radical-left (Study 2b) activism (specifically,

Figure 3. Warmth attributions, but not competence attributions, mediate the relations between the candidate's gender and support for the radical-right policy and party, among women participants (Study 1a).
The figure presents standardized effects.
Note. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 (two-tailed significance).

unlawful, violent protest) are perceived differently by the public as a function of the activist's gender (man/woman). Employing an identical experimental design to the one used in Studies 1a and 1b, we hypothesized that women respondents in the treatment condition (woman activist) will find the action and movement less objectionable than in the control condition (man activist), when the activist represents a radical-right movement (Study 2a; *H3a*), but not a radical-left movement (Study 2b; *H3b*). We further hypothesized that the effect of the radical-right activist's gender on support for the action and movement will be mediated by feminine stereotypes, such that the radical-right woman activist will be perceived as warmer than the radical-right man activist, and that the attribution of warmth will in turn increase support for the action (Study 2a; *H4*).

As in Studies 1a and 1b, we also measured competence stereotypes to rule out the possibility that attribution of typical masculine stereotypes to a woman (vs. man) activist drives the effects rather than the attribution of typical feminine stereotypes.

Sample

Participants in Study 2a (radical-right activism) were 502 Jewish-Israelis (35% rightists, 32% centrists, 33% leftists; 54% women and 46% men; age 18–87; Mage[SD] = 43.68 [15.95]). Participants in Study 2b (radical-left activism) were 507 Jewish-Israelis (32% rightists, 36% centrists, 32% leftists; 58% women and 42% men; age 18–83; Mage[SD] = 43.8 [15.47]). Sample sizes were based on power analyses using G*Power (Faul et al. 2009) for detecting a medium-sized effect (0.25) in an ANOVA, based on standard alpha (0.05) and power (80 per cent).

Participants in both studies were recruited online via a professional survey company (Panel4All). As in Studies 1a and b, we set quotas on the political orientation item (1 = right, 7 = left) before data collection to ensure a balanced sample in terms of political orientation in both samples. All scales were administered online.

Table 6. Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations between the main study variables (Study 2a)

M	SD	1	2	3
1. Participant's gender (woman)	0.54	0.50	1	
2. Participant's political orientation (left)	3.83	1.41	0.01	1	
3. Support for radical-right activism	3.17	2.21	0.05	-0.66^{***}	1

Note. $^{***}p < 0.001$ (two-tailed significance).

Table 7. Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations between the main study variables (Study 2b)

M	SD	1	2	3
4. Participant's gender (woman)	0.58	0.49	1	
5. Participant's political orientation (left)	3.90	1.38	0.06	1	
6. Support for radical-left activism	2.84	2.00	0.10^{*}	0.51^{***}	1

Note. $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{*}p < 0.05$ (two-tailed significance).

Procedure and measures

Participants first completed a demographics questionnaire as in Studies 1a and 1b, and then were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions, only that this time the fictitious Facebook posts were supposedly written by a woman or a man[11] activist advocating either radical-right activism (Study 2a: protest against the removal of illegal Jewish settlement in the West Bank) or radical-left activism (Study 2b: protest against the Separation Wall in a Palestinian village; see Supporting Information Appendix for pre-test and full content of the Facebook posts). The actor's name, profile picture and other identifying information were concealed, as in Studies 1a and b.

After reading the post, participants rated the activist on six traits related to *warmth* (Study 2a: α = 0.84; Study 2b: α = 0.86) and *competence* (Study 2a: α = 0.85; Study 2b: α = 0.84), as in Studies 1a and 1b. Finally, participants rated their *support for action and movement* on a scale ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 8 (= to a great extent): 'to what extent do you support the goal the activist is trying to promote', 'to what extent do you support the movement the activist represents', 'to what extent would you be willing to participate in similar actions organized by this movement'[12] (Study 2a: α = 0.93, Study 2b: α = 0.93).

Results and discussion

Preliminary analyses

Tables 6–7 show means, standard deviations and correlations between the main variables assessed in Studies 2a and 2b. Participants' gender and ideology were not significantly correlated in both studies. Participants' gender was *not* correlated with support for radical-right activism (Study 2a), but women participants were more supportive of radical-left activism than men (Study 2b). Left-wing orientation was negatively associated with support for radical-right activism (Study 2a) and positively associated with support for radical-left activism (Study 2b).

The effects of the activist's gender on support for action and movement (H3a, H3b)

As in Studies 1a and 1b, we first conducted two ANOVAs, one for each study, with gender of activist (woman/man), participants' gender (woman/man) and participants' political orientation (right/centre/left) as predictors, and support for action as the dependent variable. Results are presented in Table 3.

In study 2a (radical-right activist), the analysis revealed a significant main effect for the activist's gender on support for the action[13], such that participants' support for the action was significantly higher under the woman activist condition (M = 3.38, SD = 0.126) compared to the man activist condition (M = 3.01, SD = 0.128). This effect was not qualified by participants' gender, such that it was evident among women participants, but also men participants. This effect was also not qualified by participants' political orientation. Similar effects were obtained when controlling for other demographics (age, income, education, level of religiosity).

In study 2b (radical-left activist), the activist's gender did *not* have a significant effect on support for the action, nor did it interact with either participants' gender or political orientation. Similar effects were obtained when controlling for other demographics (age, income, education, level of religiosity).

To conclude, consistent with studies 1a and 1b, our findings suggest that the activist's gender affects support for radical-right, rather than radical-left activism, such that support for the action is higher when it is represented by a woman (vs. man) actor. However, unlike in Studies 1a and 1b, these effects were not qualified by participants' gender, such that men respondents were also more supportive of radical-right activism when it was represented by a woman (vs. man) activist. Thus, our findings partially support *H3a*, and fully support *H3b*. A potential explanation for this finding is that in the non-institutionalized, non-professional domain (activism), traditional feminine stereotypes such as warmth may be more pronounced for men respondents, as opposed to in the institutionalized, professional domain (parliamentary politics). Therefore, men may be more likely to be influenced by women's visibility in the non-institutionalized domain.

The mediating role of gender stereotypes (H4)

As a first step to examine *H4*, we conducted four ANOVAs, two for each study, with gender of actor (woman/man), participants' gender (woman, man) and participants' political orientation (right/centre/left) as predictors, and warmth or competence (our hypothesized and alternative mediators) as the dependent variable. Results are presented in Table 4 (warmth attributions) and Table 5 (competence attributions).

In Study 2a (radical-right activist), the activist's gender had a significant effect on attributions of warmth, such that the woman activist was perceived as significantly warmer (M = 4.67, SD = 0.124) than the man (M = 4.20, SD = 0.123). This effect was not qualified by participants' gender or political orientation. The activist's gender did not have a significant effect on attributions of competence, nor did it interact with participants' gender or political orientation to predict competence attributions. Similar effects were obtained when controlling for other demographics (age, income, education, level of religiosity).

In Study 2b (radical-left activist), the candidate's gender did not have a significant effect on warmth or competence attributions and did not interact with participants' gender or political

Figure 4. Warmth attributions mediate the relations between the actor's gender and support for radical-right activism (Study 2a). The figure present standardized scores. Note. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 (two-tailed significance).

orientation to predict perceived warmth or competence. Similar effects were obtained when controlling for other demographics (age, income, education, level of religiosity).

Having established the effect of the activist's gender on warmth attributions and on support for radical-right activism (Study 2a), we examined the hypothesis that the relations between activist's gender and support for radical-right action are mediated by increased warmth attributions, using Hayes' (2017) PROCESS bootstrapping command with 5,000 iterations (Model 4).

As hypothesized, the activist's gender positively predicted warmth attributions (b = 0.46, SE = 0.18, β = 0.25, t = 2.60, p = 0.010, [CIb] = [0.11, 0.81), indicating that participants attributed more warmth to the woman activist compared to the man activist. The direct effect of the activist's gender on support for the radical-right activism became non-significant after adding warmth attributions to the model (b = 0.08, SE = 0.16, β = 0.04, t = 0.62, p = 0.621, [CIb] = [−0.23, 0.39]), and the effect of warmth attributions on support for far-right action was significant (b = 0.53, SE = 0.03, β = 0.45, t = 11.18, p < 0.001, [CIb] = [0.44, 0.63]). Finally, the indirect effect of the activist's gender on support for action via warmth attributions was significant (b = 0.25, SE = 0.10, β = 0.11, [CIβ] = [0.03, 0.20]), in line with our mediation hypothesis (*H3b*)[14]. Similar results were obtained when controlling for competence attributions. These results are presented graphically in Figure 4.

To conclude, as in Studies 1a&1b, our findings suggest that the effect of the activist's gender on support for radical-right action is mediated by warmth attributions but not competence attributions (*H3b*), such that the woman activist is perceived as warmer than the man activist, and warmth attributions in turn increase support for the radical-right action. Contrary to Studies 1a and1b, the radical-right woman activist was not perceived as more competent than the radical-right man activist. This can be attributed to the fact that women activists may not be perceived as professionals (see Fiske 2010), as opposed to political candidates.

General discussion

Across the globe, many contemporary radical-right parties and movements now tend to visibly highlight women leaders and activists. Does this strategy reflect their attempt to attract women voters and decrease the RRGG? Indeed, Mayer (2015) has found that by 2012 the RRGG in France had significantly diminished due to the leadership of Marine Le Pen. Nevertheless, the effects of women's visibility in radical-right politics on public support for such movements, and the mechanisms underlying such effects, have not yet been systematically examined.

Across four experiments conducted in the Israeli context, we find strong evidence that women's visibility as political actors, both as parliamentary representatives (Studies 1a and 1b) and as activists (Studies 2a and 2b) on the radical-right increases support for such parties and movements, particularly among women. These findings reflect a phenomenon we term 'the radical-right gender mainstreaming model', according to which the visibility of women in the radical-right softens the hard, masculinist image of such parties and movements, a process mediated by feminine stereotypes attributed to women (vs. men) political actors. The gender mainstreaming process could be particularly effective in drawing women to such movements (Study 1a), as it removes some of the reluctance women have when it comes to the radical-right, painting it as less cold, aggressive and alienating, without changing or moderating its hard-line radical-right ideology.

Our studies also show that the gender mainstreaming model is not effective in the case of radical-left parties and movements (Studies 1b and 2b). This is likely due to the fact that these, at least in the Israeli context but likely elsewhere, do not have an overtly masculinist image, that they already have a longer history of women's visibility, and that they usually advocate gender egalitarianism (at least on the level of ideology), such that the gender of politicians and activists on the radical-left might be less of a salient cue activating countervailing gender stereotypes among the general public. This important finding complicates previous theorizing on the gender affinity effect or homophily – namely that women might simply be more likely to vote for women in general.

Our studies examine the gender mainstreaming model in formal politics and in movement activism, both of which are central arenas for radical-right politics. Importantly, while we found that a woman politician 'softens' the image of a radical-right party and its policies and thus contributes to its mainstreaming among women respondents, in the case of a radical-right women activist, this mainstreaming effect *also* increases men's support for the movement. Why is this the case? We suggested that men may react differently to women's participation in non-professional/non-institutional political settings than in professional/institutional ones, but this requires further investigation. Yet this finding also points that the mainstreaming model we propose could have a much greater impact, influencing not only women's perceptions of the radical-right, but also men's perceptions, further mainstreaming its image among the general public.

Finally, it is important to mention some of the study's limitations, and how future research could build on our work to address them. First, Israel may be a unique case. As a country involved in a protracted conflict that affects the entire population and is extremely salient politically, attitudes toward the radical-right may be more readily prone to mainstreaming. It is possible that the gender of a politician or activist on the radical-right would not have a similar effect on the general public in, for example, Europe, the United States or Asia. In addition, in countries where the radical-left is also associated with a distinctly masculinist image and where women have had relatively low levels of participation and visibility in its ranks, it is possible that a gender mainstreaming effect would work for the radical-left as well. However, since the radical-left in general often advocates a gender egalitarian ideology (even if in many places it does little to implement this) which rejects traditional division of labour along gender-complementarian lines (with women tending to 'feminine' work and men to 'masculine' work), women politicians and activists on the radical-left might not be perceived as 'warm' and 'feminine' in the same way that women on the radical-right may be. In order to rigorously test the generalizability of our theory, replication studies should take place in other countries as well.

Another potential limitation is that we examined the mainstreaming effects of the political actor's gender on a specific radical-right policy and action. Although the choice of policy and action was based on findings in a pilot test, we encourage future studies to examine the effects of women's visibility on support for other radical-right policies and actions. For instance, stripping the Supreme Court of its judicial review powers or otherwise limiting judicial ability to be a check on the executive, is currently a salient radical-right agenda in Israel as well as elsewhere. However, in other places it could also be (and has been in the past) a policy of authoritarian socialist populists or other, more centrist, political actors. Similarly, in other contexts a focus on the judiciary might not be a salient radical-right issue. We believe our findings are generalizable in terms of the radical-right gender mainstreaming effect, but to test this effect elsewhere, future research must employ radical-right policies and actions specific to the country and period under study.

Notwithstanding its limitations, this research is the first to empirically test the effects of women's visibility in radical-right politics on public support for such movements and parties. Our radical-right gender mainstreaming model has important implications for understanding the current rise in popularity and acceptance of radical-right politics. First, it would help account, among other factors, for the gradual drift of radical-right movements and parties from the political periphery to mainstream politics, despite the fact that many of them have *not* substantially moderated their radical agendas. Second, it can explain why radical-right movements and parties would be increasingly more interested in visible women's participation and representation in their ranks. Finally, it would alert those committed to democracy, tolerance and gender equality to the hazards of viewing radical-right movements as potential allies simply because of the growing visibility of women among their ranks.

Acknowledgement

Online Appendix

Additional supporting information may be found in the Online Appendix section at the end of the article:

Notes

1. Radicalism is situated at the edge of what is considered appropriate political practices and norms within a society (Cross 2013). The core of 'radicalism' is monism, that is the tendency to treat cleavages and ambivalence as illegitimate (Mudde 2010). It thus represents a radicalization of attitudes that are found in the political mainstream. Radical parties and movements are at the extreme of the political spectrum both with respect to the language they employ in confronting their political opponents and the political agendas they promote and defend (Betz & Johnson 2004). By 'radical-right' we refer to political actors that advocate radical nativist and authoritarian agendas (Betz 1994; Carter 2018; Mudde 2007). The radical-right's 'nativism' calls for states to be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas, immigrants, minorities) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state. Their 'authoritarianism' refers to the belief that society should be strictly ordered and that a strong executive branch facilitates such order. Their 'radicalism' is usually directed against liberal democracy, challenging its liberal basis, notably the value of pluralism, and the constitutional limitations to popular sovereignty. The latter can take various forms, such as weakening the legislature's or judiciary's powers, packing courts with cronies, removing executive term-limits, curbing opposition parties and press freedom, among others.

2. We use the term 'gender' to mark individuals' self-identification as men, women, or other, as well as to describe socially constructed stereotypes associated with the categories of 'man' and 'woman'. We do not use adjectives such as male and female to describe individuals (as these conventionally refer to sex) but use the adjectives 'feminine' and 'masculine' to describe types of gender stereotypes.

3. Like its European counterparts, the Israeli radical-left represents radicalization of attitudes and positions found in the mainstream left (see Fagerholm 2018 for review of the scholarship on the ideologies of radical-right and radical-left party families in contemporary Europe). These usually entail ideological commitments to

socialism, feminism, strong protections for civil rights and radical rejection of nativism, ethno-nationalism and majoritarianism (Kaminer, 2019; Wright 2018).

4. See Supporting Information Appendix. Radical-right settler parties often include both orthodox and secular representatives. While religious orthodoxy is another barrier for women's representation on the radical right, recent years have seen a significant increase in their inclusion as highly-placed candidates on these parties' lists.

5. In this study and all the following studies, although the option 'other' was also given to participants, all participants identified as either 'man' or 'woman'.

6. Specifically, the radical-right repeatedly criticized the judiciary branch, and especially judiciary review, as preferring liberal values over Jewish-nationalism (Filc 2018). This has been reflected in attempts to pass laws that limit the purview of the Court (Jamal, 2016). Between 2016 and 2020, radical-right parties proposed at least 12 bills limiting the Court (2863/20;4123/20;4129/20;4203/20; 4529/20; 4743/20;5349/20; 1404/23;1413/23;1424/23;1262/23). Critiques and efforts to limit judicial review have also been made in the past by some on the Israeli centre (Friedmann 2016; Gavison et al. 2000), yet only radical-right parties have included such agendas in their official campaign platforms (2013–2020), while centre and left parties have promoted the protection of the Court in their platforms (https://www.idi.org.il/policy/parties-and-elections/elections/2020-1/; Rosenthal et al. 2021). Even as the left and radical-left regularly criticizes the Court's decisions when these appear to violate human rights, civil rights, and international law, they do not advocate stripping down its powers (Lees 2018). On the contrary, the leftist Meretz, for example, proposed four bills between 2014 and 2020 to defend and preserve the powers of the Court (2843/19; 1204/20;486/21;1527/23).

7. We also included a 'gender-neutral candidate' control condition, in which the post and following questions were framed such that the gender of the candidate was unknown. Analyses which include the gender-neutral condition are presented in the Supporting Information Appendix. The effects of the gender-neutral condition were similar to the ones of the man candidate condition, and all findings remain when considering the gender-neutral condition in the analyses.

8. Since this item represents voting intentions, rather than support at the attitudinal level, we also conducted our analyses with this single item as the dependent variable. Results confirm that all findings remain similar when using this item as a single item dependent variable (see below).

9. A similar interaction effect was obtained when only the item assessing willingness to vote for the party was used as the dependent variable ($F(2,324) = 8.06$, $p = 0.005$), such that among women participants, willingness to vote for the party was significantly higher under the woman candidate condition (M = 3.53, SD = 0.197) compared to a man candidate condition (M = 2.83, SD = 0.233). Differences among men were non-significant. The effects of candidate gender were not qualified by participants' political orientation ($F(2,324) = 0.52$, $p = 0.597$).

10. Similar results were obtained when only the item assessing willingness to vote for the party was used as the dependent variable: The candidate's gender positively predicted warmth attributions (b = 0.76, SE = 0.24, β = 0.41, t = 3.20, p = 0.002, [CIb] [0.29, 1.24]) and competence attributions (b = 0.85 SE = 0.25, β = 0.47, t = 3.42, p = 0.001, [CIb] = [0.36, 1.33]), indicating that participants attributed more warmth and competence to the woman candidate compared to the man candidate. The direct effect of the actor's gender on willingness to vote became non-significant after adding warmth and competence attributions to the model (b = 0.25, SE = 0.25, β = 0.09, t = 1.01, p = 0.312, [CIb] = [−0.23, 0.73]), and the effect of warmth attributions on willingness to participate was significant (b = 0.69, SE = 0.10, β = 0.61, t = 6.92, p < 0.001, [CIb] = [0.49, 0.89]), whereas that of competence attributions was not (b = 0.01, SE = 0.10, β = 0.00, t = 0.08, p = 0.937, [CIb] = [−0.18, 0.19]). Finally, the indirect effect of the candidate's gender on willingness to vote was significant (b = 0.53, SE = 0.18, β = 0.48, [CIβ] = [0.20, 0.89]), in line with our mediation hypothesis.

11. As in Studies 1a and 1b, we also included a 'gender-neutral activist' control condition, in which the post and following questions were framed such that the gender of the activist is unknown. Analyses which include the gender-neutral condition are presented in the Supporting Information Appendix. The effects of the gender-neutral condition were similar to the ones of the male actor condition, and all findings remain when considering the gender-neutral condition in the analyses.

12. Since this item represents willingness to engage in action, rather than support at the attitudinal level, we also conducted our analyses with this single item as the dependent variable. Results confirm that all findings remain similar when using this item, rather than the support scale, as the dependent variable (see below).

13. A similar main effect was obtained when only the item 'assessing willingness to participate in action' was used as the dependent variable ($F(1,323) = 5.04$, p = 0.025), such that participants' willingness to participate in such action was significantly higher under the female actor condition (M = 2.94, SD = 0.146) compared to a male actor condition (M = 2.48, SD = 0.148). This effect was not qualified by participants' gender ($F(1,323)$ = 2.61, p = 0.107) or political orientation ($F(1,323) = 0.27$, p = 0.764).

14. Similar results were obtained when only the item assessing willingness to participate in action was used as the dependent variable: The actor's gender positively predicted warmth attributions (b = 0.46, SE = 0.18, β = 0.25, t = 2.60, p = 0.010, [CIb] = [0.11, 0.81]), indicating that participants attributed more warmth to the woman actor compared to the man actor. The direct effect of the actor's gender on willingness to participate became non-significant after adding warmth attributions to the model (b = 0.21, SE = 0.20, β = 0.09, t = 1.09, p = 0.276, [CIb] = [−0.17, 0.60]), and the effect of warmth attributions on willingness to participate was significant (b = 0.42, SE = 0.06, β = 0.42, t = 6.92, p < 0.001, [CIb] [0.30, 0.53]). Finally, the indirect effect of the actor's gender on willingness to participate was significant (b = 0.19, SE = 0.08, β = 0.19, [CIβ] = [0.06, 0.38]), in line with our mediation hypothesis.

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