

Revisiting the Effects of Societal Threat Perceptions on Conflict-related Positions: A Three-wave Study

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Abstract

Past research has produced convincing evidence for the association between perceived societal threat and political conservatism. Based on the view of political worldviews and threat perceptions as multifaceted constructs, the present study suggests that certain types of perceived threat are actually associated with the endorsement of more politically liberal positions. Employing a three-wave naturalistic design, we examined the unique longitudinal effects of perceived threats from real-life political events that challenge either liberal or conservative values, on conflict-related attitudes, using a nationally representative sample of Jewish-Israelis ($N = 437$). Consistent with our hypotheses, perceived threat from events that challenge conservative values was associated with increased militaristic attitudes and decreased willingness to compromise for peace over time, whereas perceived threat from events that challenge liberal values was related to decreased militaristic attitudes and increased willingness to compromise for peace over time. Theoretical and practical implications of these longitudinal effects are discussed.

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The last decades have witnessed the resurgence of ideologically inspired conflict and polarization worldwide. The surge of far-right political discourse into the mainstream, defending various sorts of ethnic nationalism, xenophobia, authoritarianism, and militarism, has become an especially pressing issue of growing concern in many Western countries, creating crucial challenges for maintaining the foundations of liberal democracy, peace, and stability.

Research shows that these processes are fueled by powerful psychological forces. Most notably, perceived threat to the social and political system, both realistic and symbolic, is considered a fundamental feature in the dynamic of embracing different manifestations of political conservatism (e.g., Duckitt and Fischer 2003; Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Jost et al. 2003; Onraet et al. 2013). A host of perceived societal threats, including threatening social and economic periods (Doty, Peterson, and Winter 1991; Feldman and Stenner 1997; McCann 2008), exposure to terrorism threats (Bonanno and Jost 2006; Davis and Silver 2004; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006; Nail et al. 2009; Thórisdóttir and Jost 2011; Ullrich and Cohrs 2007; Willer 2004), exposure to conflict-related violence (Canetti et al. 2015; Canetti et al. 2009; Lavi et al. 2014; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006), and symbolic threats to the collective's identity or value system (Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; Stenner 2009), were found to contribute to the endorsement of issue positions that are typically associated with conservatism or right-wing politics, such as right-wing authoritarianism, system justification, intolerance toward minorities, and endorsement of conflict-supporting positions. Indeed, numerous scholars and analysts attribute the current, ongoing conservative shift in Europe to threat perceptions from the surging waves of immigration to the West, sluggish economic growth, and the increasing threats of global terrorism, all of which arguably provide an environment conducive to the rise of such far-right politics (Liang 2016; Öner 2014; Shaffer 2016).

A compelling explanation for the association between threat perceptions and the endorsement of conservative political positions stems from the understanding of ideology as a “motivated social cognition” (Jost et al. 2003). According to this perspective, threat encourages people to embrace social and political attitudes that offer relatively simple yet cognitively rigid solutions to questions of system instability (Bonanno and Jost 2006; Jost et al. 2003), and these types of solutions are more often reflected in the cognitive and rhetorical styles of those on the conservative, rather than the liberal, end of the political spectrum (Jost et al. 2003, 2009). Since conservative ideologies are more suited than liberal ideologies to reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty, embracing politically conservative positions thus serves as an adaptive and effective defense mechanism against perceived societal threat.

Embracing Liberal Political Positions as a Defense Mechanism against Perceived Threat

As the aforementioned studies have shown, embracing conservative positions undoubtedly serves as an adaptive coping mechanism with a broad range of threats to society from terrorist attacks to rising unemployment rates. But does increased support for conservative positions and policies serve as the most suitable coping mechanism with any type of societal threat?

Liberal and conservative positions and policies clearly serve different functions in a given political and social system and prioritize different concerns and needs of its citizens: whereas conservative positions and policies often prioritize nationalism, respect for religious and cultural traditions, in-group loyalty, and protection of intergroup boundaries, liberal positions and policies prioritize social and economic equality, individual freedoms, civil rights, and intragroup interdependence (e.g., Janoff-Bulman 2009; Janoff-Bulman and Carns 2016). It thus follows that when society members feel that the social and political system fails to protect and sustain conservative values, they are likely to respond by defending and promoting conservative policies and positions ever more vigorously. However, when society members perceive that the system's ability to protect liberal values is compromised, they should be more likely to defend positions and policies that promote liberal, rather than conservative, values.

Nevertheless, research linking perceived societal threats to shifts toward the political right has thus far focused almost exclusively on perceived threats from events that represent a challenge to conservative values, such as threats to national security or to intergroup boundaries, in the form of immigration threats or exposure to terrorism and political violence (e.g., Bonanno and Jost 2006; Canetti et al. 2009; Canetti et al. 2015; Craig and Richeson 2014; Davis and Silver 2004; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Matthews, Levin, and Sidanius 2009; Onraet, Dhont, and Van Hiel 2014; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015; Thórisdóttir and Jost 2011; Ullrich and Cohrs 2007; Willer 2004). It is therefore not surprising that in all these studies, perceived threat led individuals to endorse positions, leaders, and policies that prioritize values associated with conservative ideologies.

But while some studies argue that such perceived threats cause a broad rightward shift in political positions (e.g., Bonanno and Jost 2006; Nail et al. 2009; Nail and McGregor 2009; Wright and Baril 2013), others have found that individuals' ideological predispositions play a key role in moderating such effects. For example, some studies show that such threat-induced shifts are more pronounced among individuals on the political right, since they tend to be more sensitive to social and political threats and to respond to them with increased hostility, intolerance, and militarism (Feldman 2003; Jost et al. 2003; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015). Other studies have shown that the opinions and preferences of individuals on the political left and center are more likely to shift following perceived threat than those

of individuals on the right, since rightists' baseline preferences already reflect a high degree of perceived threat (e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Yet other studies (Burke, Kosloff, and Landau 2013; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Greenberg et al. 1992; Stenner 2005) show that perceived threat in fact activates preexisting world-views, such that conservatives become even more concerned about maintaining the collective's well-being under threat, whereas liberals become even more concerned about protecting the freedoms and well-being of individuals within the collective.

The possibility remains, however, that certain *types* of perceived threats to the society can actually increase support for liberal positions and policies across the political spectrum, to the extent that endorsing such positions and policies is perceived as an effective means to promote the values that are perceived to be threatened. Indeed, history shows that when individual liberties or social equality is compromised, liberal values are defended and implemented ever more strongly. The American civil rights movement, Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society programs, and the democratization of formerly fascist countries like Spain and Greece are just a few salient examples.

Value-specific Perceived Societal Threats among Different Ideological Groups

The idea that perceived societal threats may increase endorsement of either conservative or liberal political positions, depending on the values society members perceive to be threatened, raises the following question: shouldn't the effects of value-specific threats on political positions depend on individuals' preexisting political and ethical orientation? Put differently, shouldn't perceived threats to liberal values affect liberals only and perceived threats to conservative values affect conservatives only?

According to moral foundations theory (MFT; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009), conservatives and liberals indeed differ in the extent to which they endorse and prioritize different sets of moral values or "foundations." According to MFT, conservatives endorse values associated with in-group/loyalty (supporting moral obligations of patriotism and "us vs. them" thinking), authority/respect (including concerns about traditions and maintaining social order), and purity/sanctity (including moral disgust and spiritual concerns about treating the body as a temple) more than liberals do. Liberals, in turn, endorse values associated with harm/care (involving intuitions of sympathy, compassion, and nurturance) and fairness/reciprocity (including notions of rights and justice) more than conservatives do. Put differently, conservatives are more concerned with "binding" moral foundations, which prioritize the welfare and survival of larger groups and institutions, whereas liberals are more concerned with "individualizing" moral foundations, which prioritize the protection and fair treatment of individuals.

Liberals' relative de-emphasis of binding foundations compared to conservatives is consistent with the view of conservatism as motivated cognition (Jost et al. 2003):

since conservatives are dispositionally more threat sensitive than liberals (e.g., Dodd et al. 2012; Oxley et al. 2008), they experience a stronger need to reinforce existing moral boundaries created by traditions, rituals, hierarchies, and social structures. The endorsement of binding moral foundations is by definition meant to reinforce sociomoral structures, by reducing uncertainty about what counts as a moral transgression and about who falls within the group's scope of moral concern (Van Leeuwen and Park 2009; Wright and Baril 2011).

Liberals' relative de-emphasis of binding foundations can also explain why some studies found that only conservatives demonstrate rightward shifts in political positions following perceived threats to national security and intergroup boundaries. Studies suggesting that liberals adopt more conservative political positions when faced with these types of perceived threat indicate, however, that although liberals supposedly do not prioritize conservative values under nonthreatening circumstances, perceived threats to these values can actually activate these "dormant" moral concerns. If liberals did not endorse conservative values at least to some extent, their threat-related fears and anxieties would probably not have been mollified by the stable, clear-cut view of the world that conservatism offers.

In fact, MFT itself (e.g., Haidt 2012) emphasizes that the weight given to different values in the moral perspectives of conservatives and liberals is relative rather than absolute. Other theories and conceptualizations of political worldviews and ideologies similarly argue that although political "liberalism" and "conservatism" are often seen as representing mutually exclusive sets of values in the political discourse, real-life political worldviews are often quite internally complex, and almost inevitably comprise beliefs and values associated with both conservatism and liberalism, such that although ideological groups differ in their value priorities in some contexts, these differences are neither absolute nor context independent (e.g., Brandt et al. 2014; Crawford and Pilanski 2014; Duckitt and Sibley 2010; Feldman and Johnston 2014; Jacoby 2006; Katz and Hass 1988; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Koole 2004; Schwartz 2007; Shamir and Arian 1994; Tetlock 1986; Wetherell, Brandt, and Reyna 2013).

If political worldviews are indeed internally complex and not unidimensional, and if perceived threats can indeed trigger the endorsement of values that are not generally endorsed under nonthreatening circumstances, we should expect political and social events that represent a challenge to liberal values to threaten some aspects of both conservatives' and liberals' worldview, at least to some degree. Therefore, we expect that perceived societal threats to liberal values may trigger stronger endorsement of liberal political positions, even among conservatives.

The Israeli Context

A young country lying at the heart of some of the most intense and intractable religious and territorial conflicts in the world, Israel has been forced to deal with persistent threats, some of which, as most Israelis feel (Bar-Tal 2001; Michael

2009), threaten its very existence. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been a particularly prominent source of threat for the Jewish-Israeli population. Over the years, the conflict has involved several wars and military operations and violent uprisings involving protracted waves of terrorism. This prolonged, violent conflict leaves its mark on both the Israeli collective and the daily lives of individual society members (Bar-Tal 2007; Canetti et al. 2009).

In addition to other implications, the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been a central factor in the deepening political polarization within the Israeli public (Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008). This polarization is also expressed in Israel’s relatively complex political system, in which various parties represent different versions of conservative and liberal worldviews. The heated (and sometimes violent) conflicts between rival ideological groups in Israel create constant battles over the identity and character of the state of Israel with options ranging from Western-style democracy to a Jewish theocracy.

In Israel’s political discourse, the terms “liberal” and “conservative” are not frequently used, and instead the dominant terminology revolves around the conflict between left and right. The political left and right are primarily divided on their attitudes toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: leftists represent more “dovish” conflict-related attitudes (support for compromises with Palestinians) and rightists represent more “hawkish” positions (higher tolerance for “collateral damage,” higher support for preemptive military actions, lower willingness to compromise for peace). Nevertheless, the ideological split between left and right in Israel is also strongly linked to the divide between liberalism and conservatism, in their broader sense, representing a struggle on issues such as the primary identity of the state as Jewish or Israeli, the state–religion issue, and the primacy of democracy or Jewish religious law (e.g., Arian and Shamir 2008; Shamir and Arian 1994). Put differently, although the value structures of leftist and rightist worldviews in the Israeli context are not mutually exclusive, leftists and rightists seem to differ in their relative value priorities (Shamir and Arian 1994), whereas Israeli leftists often prioritize liberal values such as civil rights, individual freedoms, democratic values, and separation of religion and state and Israeli rightists often emphasize conservative values such as the concern for established cultural and religious traditions, social order, and preservation of the ethnic national identity of the state of Israel.

Consistent with previous research, studies on the effects of threat perceptions in the Israeli context have generally found that perceived threat leads Jewish-Israelis to adopt more militant and conflict-supporting positions (e.g., Canetti et al. 2009, 2015; Hirschberger, Pyszczynski, and Ein-Dor 2009; Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2014; Imhoff et al. 2016; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015). Nevertheless, these studies focused almost exclusively on perceived threats to conservative values (e.g., resulting from threats to national security and to intergroup boundaries) or perceived existential threats (e.g., resulting from mortality salience and reminders of collective trauma). No research has thus far been conducted about the effects of perceived threats to liberal values, on the societal or collective level, on Jewish-Israelis’

political positions. Israel therefore provides an excellent setting for the study of the unique effects of value-specific perceived societal threats, on political positions in the context of protracted, ongoing conflict.

The Present Study

The goal of the present study is to elucidate the relationship between perceived societal threats and political positions in the context of prolonged, real-life political conflict. In an attempt to expand previous research associating perceived societal threat with greater endorsement of conservative political positions, we suggest that certain types of real-life societal threats are in fact best addressed by adopting more liberal political positions. To take into account the multifaceted nature of real-life political and social events on the one hand, and threat perceptions on the other, we examined this hypothesis using a naturalistic, three-wave longitudinal design, using a large nationally representative sample of Jewish-Israelis.

Although some excellent work has been conducted to examine the longitudinal effects of perceived threat on political positions (Matthews, Levin, and Sidanius 2009; Margalit 2013; Onraet, Dhont, and Van Hiel 2014; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015), an important unique feature of this study is that we investigate possible differential longitudinal effects of different types of perceived societal threats. In line with theories on the value priorities associated with liberal and conservative worldviews (e.g., Haidt 2012; Jost et al. 2003; Shamir and Arian 1994; Tetlock 1986), we distinguish between perceived societal threat from exposure to political and social events that challenge liberal values and perceived threat from exposure to events that challenge conservative values and investigated their simultaneous longitudinal effects on conflict-related attitudes in the Israel context.

To test these longitudinal effects, we used a full cross-lagged panel design. A cross-lagged panel design enabled us to examine the “pure” effects of each perceived threat variable on conflict-related attitudes over time, controlling for the autocorrelation of all variables, the intercorrelations of all variables at earlier time points, and the inverse relationships between conflict-related attitudes and perceived threats.

We operationalized conflict-related attitudes using militaristic attitudes and willingness to compromise for peace, both of which were previously found to be strongly related to threat perceptions in the context of conflict (Halperin and Bar-Tal 2011; Maoz and McCauley 2008, 2009). Whereas perceived threat from social and political events that challenge conservative values (“perceived conservative threat”) was hypothesized to be associated with increased militaristic attitudes and decreased willingness to compromise over time, perceived threat from events that challenge liberal values (“perceived liberal threat”) was hypothesized to be associated with decreased militaristic attitudes and increased willingness to compromise over time, across the political spectrum.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Data were collected online by Midgam Project Web Panel, an Israeli Internet-survey company. Participants signed an electronic informed consent form before participating in each wave and were rewarded with monetary compensation.

The study included three waves of measurement, collected three months apart. The first wave of measurement included a sample of 437 Jewish-Israelis who largely represented the distribution in the adult Jewish-Israeli population in terms of gender and age (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics)¹: 52 percent ($n = 228$) were women and 48 percent ($n = 209$) were men, with ages ranging from nineteen to seventy-seven ($M = 41.2$, standard deviation [SD] = 15.5). Forty-six percent had college/university education, 28 percent had other post-high school education, and 26 percent had high school or less than high school education. Forty-three 43 percent reported below the average income, 30.4 percent average income, 17 percent above average income, and the rest reported no income. In terms of religiosity, 60 percent defined themselves secular, 21 percent traditional, 13 percent religious, and the rest very religious. In terms of party identification, 42 percent identified with liberal parties, 44 percent with conservative parties, and the rest with parties not classified as either liberal or conservative.² Twenty-one percent of respondents dropped out between waves 1 and 2 and 16 percent between waves 2 and 3.³

In each wave of measurement, participants were presented with six unique reports of recent events with political or social significance that took place after the previous time of measurement and were widely covered in the Israeli media, three of which were chosen so as to represent a challenge to conservative values, applied to the Israeli political context (“Jewish” character of the state of Israel, ethnic nationalism, national security, and hawkish attitudes regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict), whereas the rest were chosen so as to represent a challenge to liberal values in the Israeli context (e.g., individual freedoms, civil rights, separation of religion and state, and dovish attitudes regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; Haidt 2012; Jost et al. 2003; Shamir and Arian 1994). After reading these reports, participants rated the extent to which they perceived these events as posing a threat to the future of Israel. Finally, in each wave, participants completed three questionnaires assessing their party identification, willingness to compromise for peace, and militaristic attitudes. All questionnaires were distributed in random order.⁴

Tools

Predictor Variables

Perceived collective threat. In each wave, participants were presented with six different passages created by the researchers, each describing recent political events that received considerable coverage in the Israeli media. These reports covered stories

about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, governmental decisions with political implications, policy changes, and so on. Three of these events represented violations of conservative societal values in the Israeli context (e.g., Israelis signing a petition calling on pilots from the Israeli air force to refuse to launch an attack on Iran if they are ordered to do so; the European Commission has announced its intention to help maintain Palestinians’ presence in area C; the Jordan Valley division deputy commander, who was filmed hitting a left-wing Danish activist in the face with his rifle, was removed from his post by the Israel Defense Force Chief of General Staff), and three represented violations of liberal societal values in the Israeli context (e.g., The Israeli High Court prohibits the granting of any residency or citizenship status for the purpose of family reunification to Palestinians from the occupied Palestinian territories; The Knesset Education, Culture, and Sports Committee bans a civics textbook which has been approved by the Education Ministry on account that its content is too liberal and not sufficiently nationalistic; the government announced its support for a law that limits the ability of foreign governments and international organizations to contribute to Israeli nongovernmental organizations protecting the human rights of Palestinians; Haidt 2012; Jost 2006). After reading each of the six passages presented in each wave, participants rated the extent to which they perceived each event as posing a threat to the future of Israel (“this event makes me concerned for the future of Israel”), on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

In each wave, perceived threat scores on the three passages representing a violation of liberal values were averaged to construct the perceived liberal threat scale, whereas perceived threat scores on three passages representing a violation of conservative values were averaged to construct the perceived conservative threat scale. Therefore, each participant had two threat scores (i.e., perceived liberal threat and perceived conservative threat) for each time of measurement.

Adequate reliabilities were found for both perceived conservative threat ($\alpha = .60$ to $.79$) and perceived liberal threat ($\alpha = .72$ to $.80$). To further confirm the distinctiveness of each of those variables, exploratory factor analysis was conducted for all six perceived threat scores in each wave of measurement, using principal component analysis with varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization. The results presented in Table 1 show that the analysis yielded a very clear two-factor solution that is compatible with our preliminary construction of the scales.

Party identification was assessed using the following question: “with which of the following political parties do you most identify?” While many studies in the Israeli context use the left–right continuum to measure political orientation, these terms are usually understood as synonymous to dovish and hawkish positions in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Reifen Tagar et al. 2014). Indeed, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a key issue dimension in Israeli politics and plays an important role in determining voting preferences (Arian and Shamir 2008; Shamir and Shamir 2008). Nevertheless, we were interested in the broader ideological categories of political liberalism and conservatism, as they are reflected in the Israeli context, to

Table 1. Exploratory Factor Analyses for Perceived Liberal Threat and Perceived Conservative Threat.

Item	Factor (F) loadings	
	F1 (liberal threat)	F2 (conservative threat)
Wave 1		
Liberal threat 1	.784	.114
Liberal threat 2	.825	-.063
Liberal threat 3	.822	-.148
Conservative threat 1	-.076	.771
Conservative threat 2	-.024	.845
Conservative threat 3	.015	.841
Variance explained: 67.26 percent		
Wave 2		
Liberal threat 1	.818	-.005
Liberal threat 2	.864	.026
Liberal threat 3	.848	-.052
Conservative threat 1	-.028	.850
Conservative threat 2	.028	.840
Conservative threat 3	-.031	.825
Variance explained: 70.83 percent		
Wave 3		
Liberal threat 1	.847	-.046
Liberal threat 2	.873	.050
Liberal threat 3	.794	.117
Conservative threat 1	.167	.857
Conservative threat 2	-.160	.671
Conservative threat 3	.123	.701
Variance explained: 64.55 percent		

Note: Entries in boldface represent factor loadings greater than .65.

the extent that they represent positions on broader issues pertaining to the character of the Israeli society (e.g., individual freedoms, civil rights, ethnic nationalism, democratic values, and separation of religion and state) alongside positions regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The liberal–conservative distinction, which is commonly used in self-placement measures of ideology, is neither used nor commonly understood by the general public in Israel. As no other self-report measures of conservatism/liberalism were validated in Israel, we chose party identification as a proxy for conservative and liberal political positions, broadly defined, in the Israeli context.

The list of political parties provided to participants included all parties that were represented in the Israeli parliament at that time of the study (see Online Appendix, section A, for the full list of parties). Classification of parties as politically liberal or conservative was based on the parties' position on both the "security and foreign policy" (dovish/"hawkish" positions) and "religion and state" dimensions, using an a

priori classification system (see Arian and Shamir 2011; Shamir 2015). Participants' party identification in each wave of measurement was thus represented by a dichotomous variable that was assigned the value 1 for identification with liberal parties and 0 for identification with conservative parties.⁵

Although dovish and hawkish positions regarding the conflict are strongly related to politically liberal and politically conservative positions regarding the character of the Israeli society (Arian and Shamir 2008; Shamir and Arian 1994), the association between dovish positions and political liberalism, on the one hand, and hawkish positions and political conservatism, on the other, does not apply to ultraorthodox, communist and non-Jewish parties. Therefore, participants who indicated that they identify with these parties, which were not classified as either politically liberal or politically conservative, were assigned a missing value on the party identification measure.

Dependent Variables

Willingness to compromise for peace was assessed using two items, rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): (1) "we should consider giving up the Golan heights in return for sustainable peace with Syria" and (2) "we should consider evacuating Jewish settlements in return for sustainable peace with the Palestinians;" $\alpha = .90$ in all waves.

Militaristic attitudes was assessed using three items rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): (1) "It is justified to conduct preemptive strikes on countries and entities that pose a threat to the state of Israel," (2) "It is justified to harm civilians in order to prevent hostile entities to threaten the state of Israel," and (3) "war is sometimes necessary to maintain Israel's superiority;" $\alpha = .76$ to $.81$.

Data Analysis and Model Specification

Before conducting our main analyses, we computed means, *SDs*, and bivariate correlations between the study variables. To examine our main hypotheses, we conducted two cross-lagged structural equation modeling (SEM) analyses, one for each dependent variable, using maximum likelihood estimation. In each model, we tested the directional relationships between the predictors (perceived liberal threat and perceived conservative threat), party identification, the interaction terms of each threat variable with party identification, and the dependent variables (willingness to compromise for peace or militaristic attitudes). All predictor variables were standardized prior to multiplying them together to create the interaction terms, as recommended in Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004), as were the dependent variables before entered into the model. All interaction terms in the model were modeled as exogenous variables. The conceptual diagram of our hypothesized moderation models is presented in Figure 1 (for ease of presentation, Figure 1 only presents directional relationships between the variables in the model. Bidirectional relationships are described as follows).




Figure 1. The path diagram of the hypothesized moderation models: directional relationships between perceived conservative threat, perceived liberal threat, party identification, and willingness to compromise for peace (model 1)/militaristic attitudes (model 2). Solid paths represent the hypothesized directional relationships.

To rule out the possibility that the effects of perceived threat originate in party identification, we also examined an alternative model in which perceived conservative threat and perceived liberal threat mediate the relationship between party identification and willingness to compromise for peace (model 3) or militaristic attitudes (model 4). In each SEM model, we tested the directional paths leading from party identification to the dependent variable via perceived conservative threat and perceived liberal threat, using a bootstrapping procedure with maximum likelihood estimation, 2,000 samples, and bias-corrected 95 percent confidence intervals (CIs:




Figure 2. The path diagram of the alternative mediation models: directional relationships between party identification, perceived conservative threat, perceived liberal threat, and willingness to compromise for peace (model 3)/militaristic attitudes. Solid paths represent the hypothesized directional relationships.

Preacher and Hayes 2008). Missing data were handled prior to the mediation analyses using a listwise deletion procedure.⁶ The conceptual diagram of the mediation models is presented in Figure 2.

In each of the four cross-lagged SEMs, three types of associations were specified: synchronous, stability, and cross-lagged. Synchronous associations in the mediation models pertained to cross-sectional associations between the variables at each wave (in the moderation models, wave 1 variables were covaried, along with all other exogenous variables including waves 2 and 3 interaction terms. In waves 2 and 3, the associations were between the “disturbances” of the putative variables, excluding the interaction terms). Stability, or autoregressive, effects referred to the effect of a variable at a given wave on the same variable at a subsequent assessment wave. Stability effects were estimated at each longitudinal node, namely, at the W1 to W2 and the W2 to W3 periods, while allowing for the possibility that autoregressive stability exists across the W1 to W3 period, hence specifying the putative stability

Table 2. Means, SDs and Independent Samples *t*-tests for the Study Variables.

Variable	Identified with conservative parties		Identified with liberal parties		<i>t</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
Liberal threat 1	2.60	1.40	3.63	1.57	-6.58***
Conservative threat 1	4.30	1.50	2.63	1.25	11.47***
Compromise 1	2.18	1.52	4.42	1.80	-12.74***
Militaristic attitudes 1	5.20	1.29	4.00	1.29	8.91***
Liberal threat 2	2.97	1.48	4.35	1.67	-7.29***
Conservative threat 2	4.05	1.66	2.48	1.25	8.93***
Compromise 2	2.12	1.41	4.63	1.51	-14.37***
Militaristic attitudes 2	5.16	1.29	4.00	1.29	7.74***
Liberal threat 3	2.62	1.42	4.05	1.48	-7.66***
Conservative threat 3	4.50	1.45	3.85	1.31	3.69***
Compromise 3	2.13	1.36	4.00	1.56	-11.97***
Militaristic attitudes 3	5.06	1.24	3.88	1.34	7.09***

Note: In each *t*-test, the party identification scale used corresponds to the measurement time of the dependent variables. *SD* = standard deviation.

****p* < .001 (two-tailed significance).

coefficients (stability effects were not estimated for the interaction terms, as these were modeled as exogenous variables). Finally, cross-lagged effects pertained to the effect of one variable at a given wave on another variable at a subsequent wave, while controlling for both synchronous and stability effects. Cross-lagged effects were estimated at each longitudinal node, namely, at the W1 to W2 and the W2 to W3 periods. Cross-lagged effects were estimated at each longitudinal node, namely, at the W1 to W2 and the W2 to W3 periods.

After running the above-described cross-lagged SEMs, we omitted nonsignificant path coefficients so as to arrive at the most parsimonious model (MPM; Bentler and Mooijaart 1989). We then compared this MPM to the default, or relaxed, model, so as to make sure that model fit was not compromised by securing parsimony. In all models, we chose to assess our variables as manifest indicators rather than latent factors, because our focal constructs—perceived threats—were measured based on a single variable.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 reports the means, *SD*s, and independent samples *t*-tests examining the differences between individuals identifying with liberal versus conservative parties in all study variables. As shown in Table 2, and in line with our hypotheses, perceived liberal-threat scores were significantly higher among individuals who identify with liberal parties compared to individuals who identify with conservative

parties, whereas perceived conservative-threat scores were significantly higher among individuals who identify with conservative parties compared to individuals who identify with liberal parties. Also, as expected, willingness to compromise for peace was significantly higher among individuals who identify with liberal parties, whereas militaristic attitudes were significantly higher among individuals who identify with conservative parties.

Table 3 presents bivariate correlations between the study variables. In line with our hypotheses, perceived conservative threat was positively associated with militaristic attitudes and negatively associated with willingness to compromise for peace, whereas perceived liberal threat was negatively associated with militaristic attitudes and positively associated with willingness to compromise for peace, in all waves of measurement. Perceived liberal threat and perceived conservative threat did not correlate in either of the measurement waves. Party identification was moderately to strongly correlated with perceived conservative threat and perceived liberal threat in all waves ($r = .23$ to $.52$), although the correlation did not exceed the cutoff point of multicollinearity (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Correlations between party identification scores ranged from $.83$ to $.89$, since few participants changed their voting preferences during the course of the study, either from liberal to conservative or from conservative to liberal (thirty-two participants).⁷

Hypothesized Model: The Interactive Effect of Threat Perceptions and Party Identification on Conflict-related Attitudes

We conducted two cross-lagged SEM analysis to examine the interactive effects of perceived conservative threat/perceived liberal threat and party identification on participants' willingness to compromise for peace (model 1, see Figure 1) and militaristic attitudes (model 2, see Figure 1). The relaxed models, in which parameters were freely estimated, evinced excellent fit to the data; for compromise: $\chi^2(df = 29) = 42.11, p = .055$; $\chi^2/df = 1.45$; Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) = $.97$, comparative fit index (CFI) = $.99$; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = $.03$ and for militaristic attitudes: $\chi^2(df = 29) = 49.51, p = .010$; $\chi^2/df = 1.71$; TLI = $.95$; CFI = $.99$; RMSEA = $.04$. We then removed statistically nonsignificant parameters from these models, arriving at the MPMs, which also evinced excellent fit to the data; for compromise: $\chi^2(df = 96) = 101.22, p = .338$; $\chi^2/df = 1.05$; TLI = 1.00 ; CFI = 1.00 ; RMSEA = $.01$ and for militaristic attitudes: $\chi^2(df = 68) = 101.92, p = .005$; $\chi^2/df = 1.50$; TLI = $.96$; CFI = $.99$; RMSEA = $.03$. χ^2 difference tests (CSDTs) indicated that the relaxed and MPMs are equivalent in terms of fit; for compromise: $\Delta\chi^2(df = 67) = 59.11, p = .743$ and for militaristic attitudes: $\Delta\chi^2(df = 39) = 52.41, p = .075$. Thus, the MPMs were chosen to be the final models.

Statistically significant parameters for the final (most parsimonious) model predicting willingness to compromise for peace (model 1) are presented in Figure 3. As

Table 3. Bivariate Correlations between the Study Variables.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Liberal threat 1	1														
2. Conservative threat 1	-0.08	1													
3. Party identification 1	0.32***	-0.52***	1												
4. Compromise 1	0.43***	-0.53***	0.56***	1											
5. Militantistic attitudes 1	-0.25***	0.50***	-0.42***	-0.34***	1										
6. Liberal threat 2	0.47***	-0.17**	0.37***	0.31***	-0.22***	1									
7. Conservative threat 2	-0.23***	0.52***	-0.41***	-0.46***	0.38***	-0.03	1								
8. Party identification 2	0.31***	-0.53***	0.83***	0.62***	-0.38***	0.40***	-0.47***	1							
9. Compromise 2	0.45***	-0.52***	0.54***	0.81***	-0.40***	0.42***	-0.48***	0.66***	1						
10. Militantistic attitudes 2	-0.42***	0.43***	-0.37***	-0.46***	0.63***	-0.27***	0.49***	-0.42***	-0.47***	1					
11. Liberal threat 3	0.60***	-0.17**	0.44***	0.43***	-0.33***	0.54***	-0.21***	0.40***	0.44***	-0.37***	1				
12. Conservative threat 3	-0.07	0.43***	-0.20***	-0.22***	0.35***	0.03	0.38***	-0.24***	-0.20***	0.39***	0.11	1			
13. Party identification 3	.41***	-0.52***	0.89***	0.64***	-0.39***	0.37***	-0.40***	0.85***	0.61***	-0.41***	0.44***	0.44***	1		
14. Compromise 3	0.42***	-0.50***	0.54***	0.81***	-0.42***	0.34***	-0.51***	0.60***	0.87***	-0.46***	0.49***	-0.17**	0.61***	1	
15. Militantistic attitudes 3	-0.39***	0.41***	-0.45***	-0.48***	0.64***	-0.36***	0.39***	-0.43***	-0.46***	0.73***	-0.39***	0.41***	-0.41***	-0.45***	1

Note: Party identification was coded such that 0 = conservative parties; 1 = liberal parties.

**p < .01 (two-tailed significance).

***p < .001 (two-tailed significance).




Figure 3. Statistically significant cross-lagged paths (standardized estimates) in the hypothesized moderation model (model 1): directional relationships between perceived conservative threat, perceived liberal threat, party identification, and willingness to compromise for peace. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$, [†] $p < .10$ (two-tailed significance). Solid paths represent the hypothesized directional relationships.

shown in Figure 3, and consistent with our hypotheses, wave 1 perceived conservative threat predicted a decrease in wave 2 willingness to compromise ($b = -.08$, standard error [SE] = .04, $\beta = -.08$, Critical Ratio [CR] = -2.16 , $p = .03$). Similarly, wave 2 perceived conservative threat predicted a decrease in wave 3 willingness to compromise ($b = -.07$, $SE = .03$, $\beta = -.07$, $CR = -2.22$, $p = .026$). The hypothesized positive relationship between perceived liberal threat and willingness to compromise was only significant between waves 1 and 2 ($b = .13$, SE

= .03, $\beta = .13$, $CR = 3.76$, $p < .001$). Party identification did not interact with either perceived liberal threat (wave 1: $b = -.03$, $SE = .04$, $\beta = -.03$, $CR = -.77$, $p = .44$; wave 2: $b = .02$, $SE = .03$, $\beta = .01$, $CR = .46$, $p = .64$) or perceived conservative threat (wave 1: $b = -.05$, $SE = .04$, $\beta = -.04$, $CR = -1.15$, $p = .25$; wave 2: $b = .00$, $SE = .04$, $\beta = .00$, $CR = -.01$, $p = .99$) to predict willingness to compromise for peace. The effects of these interactions were therefore omitted from the parsimonious model.

Similar result patterns were obtained with regard to militaristic attitudes (model 2), as shown in Figure 4. Consistent with our hypotheses, wave 1 perceived liberal threat predicted a decrease in wave 2 militaristic attitudes ($b = -.24$, $SE = .04$, $\beta = -.24$, $CR = -5.85$, $p < .001$). Similarly, wave 2 perceived liberal threat predicted a decrease in wave 3 militaristic attitudes ($b = -.11$, $SE = .04$, $\beta = -.11$, $CR = -2.79$, $p = .005$). The hypothesized positive relationship between perceived conservative threat and militaristic attitudes was only significant between waves 1 and 2 ($b = .17$, $SE = .05$, $\beta = .17$, $CR = 3.79$, $p < .001$). Party identification did not interact with either perceived liberal threat (wave 1: $b = .05$, $SE = .05$, $\beta = .05$, $CR = 1.17$, $p = .24$; wave 2: $b = .04$, $SE = .05$, $\beta = .04$, $CR = .85$, $p = .40$) or perceived conservative threat (wave 1: $b = .22$, $SE = .05$, $\beta = .02$, $CR = .43$, $p = .66$; wave 2: $b = .02$, $SE = .05$, $\beta = .02$, $CR = .49$, $p = .62$) to predict militaristic attitudes. The effects of these interactions were therefore omitted from the parsimonious model.

Taken together, these findings provide evidence for the hypothesized longitudinal relationship between perceived conservative threat, increased militaristic attitudes and decreased willingness to compromise for peace as well as for the longitudinal relationship between perceived liberal threat, decreased militaristic attitudes, and increased willingness to compromise for peace. These effects, as hypothesized, were not moderated by party identification.⁸

Inspection of the patterns of cross-lagged effects in both models also reveal some significant inverse relationship between conflict-related attitudes and perceived conservative threat, such that willingness to compromise was associated with a prospective decrease in perceived conservative threat (see Figure 3), and militaristic attitudes were associated with a prospective increase in perceived conservative threat (see Figure 4). Also, results of both models reveal significant longitudinal effects involving party identification and perceived threats, such that identification with liberal parties is positively associated with perceived liberal threat and negatively associated with conservative threat.

Alternative Model: The Role of Perceived Threat in Mediating the Relationship between Party Identification and Conflict-related Attitudes

We conducted two cross-lagged SEMs to examine the alternative mediation hypothesis, whereby the longitudinal relationships between party identification and willingness to compromise for peace (model 3, see Figure 2) and militaristic attitudes




Figure 4. Statistically significant cross-lagged paths (standardized estimates) in the hypothesized moderation model (model 2): directional relationships between perceived conservative threat, perceived liberal threat, party identification, and militaristic attitudes. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$, † $p < .10$ (two-tailed significance). Solid paths represent the hypothesized directional relationships.

(model 4, see Figure 2) are mediated by perceived liberal threats and conservative threats. The relaxed models, in which parameters were freely estimated, evinced a relatively poor fit to the data; for compromise: $\chi^2(df=28) = 108.28, p < .001; \chi^2/df = 3.87; TLI = .90; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .12$ and for militaristic attitudes: $\chi^2(df=28) = 107.03, p < .001; \chi^2/df = 3.82; TLI = .88; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .12$. We then removed statistically nonsignificant parameters from each model, arriving at the MPMs, which also evinced a relatively poor fit to the data; for compromise: $\chi^2(df=40) = 119.60, p < .001; \chi^2/df = 2.99; TLI = .93; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .10$




Figure 5. Statistically significant cross-lagged paths (standardized estimates) in the alternative mediation model (model 3): directional relationships between perceived conservative threat, perceived liberal threat, party identification, and willingness to compromise for peace. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed significance).

and for militaristic attitudes: $\chi^2_{(df = 40)} = 126.94, p < .001$; $\chi^2/df = 3.17$; TLI = .91; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .10. CSDTs indicated that the relaxed and MPMs are equivalent in terms of fit; for compromise: $\Delta\chi^2_{(df = 12)} = 11.32, p = .502$ and for militaristic attitudes: $\Delta\chi^2_{(df = 12)} = 19.91, p = .069$.

Statistically significant parameters for the final (most parsimonious) model predicting willingness to compromise for peace (model 3) are presented in Figure 5. As shown in Figure 5, no significant cross-lagged mediation patterns were found for willingness to compromise, such that neither perceived conservative threat nor perceived liberal threat significantly mediated the relationship between party identification and willingness to compromise for peace.

Statistically significant parameters for the final (most parsimonious) model predicting militaristic attitudes (model 4) are presented in Figure 6. As shown in Figure 6, in only one of the examined cross-lagged mediation effects, perceived conservative threat mediated the relationship between party identification and militaristic attitudes. More specifically, identification with liberal political parties in wave 1 was associated with a decrease in perceived conservative threat in wave 2 ($b = -.86$,




Figure 6. Statistically significant cross-lagged paths (standardized estimates) in the alternative mediation model (model 4): directional relationships between perceived conservative threat, perceived liberal threat, party identification, and militaristic attitudes. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed significance).

$SE = .21$, $\beta = -.26$, $CR = -4.10$, $p < .001$), which was in turn associated with increased militaristic attitudes in wave 2 ($b = .22$, $SE = .05$, $\beta = .26$, $CR = 4.62$, $p < .001$). The indirect effect of wave 1 party identification on wave 2 militaristic attitudes was significant ($\beta = -.44$, $SE = .04$, 95 percent CI = $-.52, -.36$, $p = .001$). Nevertheless, this significant mediation effect was not replicated between waves 2 and 3 and was not significant with regard to perceived liberal threat.⁹

Discussion

This aim of this study was to examine the hypothesis that although certain types of perceived societal threats are associated with adherence to conservative political positions, other types of perceived societal threat can be associated with increased endorsement of liberal political positions. The guiding hypothesis of this study was therefore that different types of perceived threat, or the extent to which individuals feel threatened by political and social events that represent violations of liberal versus conservative societal values, have unique effects on long-term changes in political positions. Employing a three-wave naturalistic design, we examined the

unique longitudinal effects of perceived threats to liberal and conservative values on Jewish-Israelis' conflict-related attitudes: support for militaristic attitudes and willingness to compromise for peace.

As expected, and consistent with previous studies in Israel and in other contexts, perceived threat to conservative values (e.g., threats to intergroup boundaries, cultural and religious traditions, and national security) was associated with increased support for militaristic attitudes and decreased willingness to compromise for peace over time among Jewish-Israelis who identify with both liberal and conservative political parties. Our findings also provide evidence for an inverse relationship between conflict-related attitudes and perceived conservative threat, such that low willingness to compromise and high support for militaristic attitudes are associated with increased perceived conservative threat over time. These findings suggest that perceived conservative threat and conservative attitudes may be dynamically interrelated and may mutually reinforce each other, consistent with previous studies (e.g., Cohrs 2013; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Matthews, Levin, and Sidanius 2009; Onraet, Dhont, and Van Hiel 2014; Sibley and Duckitt 2013).

Most importantly, we found evidence for the hypothesized longitudinal relationship between perceived liberal threat and conflict-related positions. Specifically, perceived threat from political and social events that challenge liberal values (e.g., threats to individual freedoms, civil rights, and separation of religion and state) was associated with decreased support for militaristic attitudes and increased willingness to compromise for peace, over time. As hypothesized, and consistent with the basic assumptions of MFT (e.g., Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009), these effects were also not moderated by party identification. As our robustness checks suggest (see Online Appendix, Section B2 to B5), these effects were also robust to other ideology-related moderators.

Although the associations between perceived liberal and conservative threats and party identification did not suggest high degree of multicollinearity, we wanted to rule out the possibility that party identification predicts conflict-related attitudes through its effects on perceived threats by examining alternative cross-lagged models in which perceived threat mediates the longitudinal relationships between party identification and conflict-related attitudes. Consistent with our hypotheses, the mediation models evinced poor fit to the data. Nevertheless, examination of the significant paths within these models suggests that while our original hypotheses were fully supported with regard to perceived liberal threat, mediation cannot be completely ruled out with regard to perceived conservative threat. A possible explanation for this finding lies in the basic assumptions of MFT (e.g., Haidt 2012). According to the theory, although conservatives' endorse binding moral foundations significantly more than liberals do, the differences between conservatives' and liberals' endorsement of individualizing moral foundations is considerably smaller (e.g., Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Our original hypothesis, according to which perceived liberal and conservative threats have unique effects on conflict-related attitudes over and above party identification, may thus better apply to perceived

liberal threats since both liberals and conservatives share a similar concern for liberal values.

In fact, the findings of the mediation models support our call to distinguish between different sources, or types, of perceived threat. As our results suggest, and consistent with previous conceptualizations of the value priorities associated with liberal and conservative political worldviews (Haidt 2012; Schwartz 2007; Shamir and Arian 1994), all participants in our study rated all threat-inducing passages as threatening to some extent. This indicates that although beliefs in equality, individual liberties, and civil rights are generally associated with liberal political worldviews, these values are undoubtedly dear to the overwhelming majority of Israeli citizens, conservatives, and liberals alike. Similarly, although conservatives are by definition more concerned with the protection of nationalistic and patriotic values, all Israeli Jews are, at least to some degree, committed to the protection of Israel's legitimacy and safety. Nevertheless, bivariate correlations and a factor analysis indicate that perceived liberal threat and perceived conservative threat are independent constructs, providing further evidence that these scales are based on responses to events that challenge different values.

Although these findings have important theoretical implications, the present study has several limitations. First, the magnitudes of the longitudinal relationships between the variables reported in this study were relatively modest. However, small effects are not surprising, given the statistical analysis of a cross-lagged longitudinal model: because we control for prior levels of each variable by including autoregressive paths, a substantial part of the variance is already explained by prior levels of the same variable (e.g., Onraet et al. 2013). When investigating variables such as party identification, militaristic attitudes, and willingness to compromise for peace, which show relatively high stability over time, not much variance is left for lagged effects of other variables, resulting in relatively modest effects. Future studies are encouraged to adapt a larger time lag between the measurement points. A small effects may potentially accumulate over time and result in larger effects.

A second issue arising is the generalizability of our findings to other political contexts, particularly to ones that do not involve protracted conflict. Israelis are comparatively well informed and involved in political matters, in part due to the salience of conflict, and may thus respond more intensely to challenges to their values as compared to participants of other cultures. Also, Israelis' political worldviews are particularly complex in terms of the extent to which they include various conflicting values and beliefs, as a result of Israel's ongoing culture war about Israel's collective identity (see Arian and Shamir 2008). Future studies are encouraged to examine the unique effects of value-specific threat perceptions on political attitudes in less polarized, or less conflicted, political environments. In addition, future studies in contexts of ongoing political conflict are encouraged to examine whether the effects of perceived liberal and conservative threats extend beyond shifts in conflict-related positions, for example, positions on domestic issues. Although investigating the effects of perceived liberal and conservative threats on

positions regarding such a partisan and contentious issue dimension in the Israeli political discourse as the conflict constitutes a particularly strong test of our hypotheses, we encourage future studies to examine the effects of perceived threat on political positions in other domains. In particular, we encourage studies in other political contexts to consider issue domains that are particularly salient in the chosen political context (e.g., threats and outcome variables pertaining to environmental issues and immigration in Western Europe and to gay rights and abortions in the United States). Examining a wider variety of perceived threat sources and issue positions could help gain a more nuanced understanding on the effects of different types of threat perceptions.

Finally, future research should consider using additional measures of political orientation as moderators in the longitudinal relationship between perceived threat and political positions, contingent upon the unique characteristic of the chosen political context. Although we conducted robustness checks indicating that the effects of perceived liberal and conservative threats are robust to several alternative ideology-related moderators in the Israeli context (e.g., continuous measure of party identification, strength of party identification, positions on the issue of "Greater Israel," see Online Appendix, Sections B2-B5), future studies in other political contexts should consider the use of additional, context-specific indicators of political orientation as potential moderators.

Notwithstanding its limitations, however, our findings provide empirical support for the idea that all human beings are committed, albeit in varying degrees, to values that conflict with each other. As a result, political worldviews are agonistically plural, as political philosopher Isaiah Berlin has famously argued (Gray 1995). Correspondingly, recognizing this plurality may be essential in understanding the effects of threat perceptions on conflict-related attitudes. More specifically, our findings suggest that different types of perceived threat have unique and even opposite, longitudinal effects on conflict-related attitudes. While most research found perceived threat to be associated with intergroup hostility and conflict-supporting attitudes (e.g., Bonanno and Jost 2006; Canetti et al. 2009; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015), our findings suggest that some types of perceived threat can actually facilitate more conciliatory, dovish positions in the context of protracted conflict. This has practical consequences: our findings indicate that interventions aimed at reducing perceived conservative threat and reframing social and political events in terms of challenges to liberal values could help mitigate conflict-supporting beliefs among liberals and conservatives alike. In other words, making the liberal-within-the-conservative and the liberal-within-the-liberal salient could help break the vicious cycle of intergroup hostility created by perceived conservative threat.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. See <http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader>, accessed at March 29, 2017.
2. For more details about this classification process, see the Method section and Online Appendix (Section A).
3. Independent samples *t*-tests did not reveal significant differences in the study variables between participants who completed three waves, two waves, and one wave. However, significant differences in age, gender, and education were found between participants who completed all three waves and participants who completed the first and second waves only. While the proportion of women in the group who participated in two waves was 37 percent, the proportion of women who participated in all waves was 53 percent, $\chi^2(1) = 4.92, p = .03$. Participants who completed all three waves were slightly more educated than participants who completed the first and second waves only, with a higher proportion of participants having at least a bachelor's degree (36 percent and 27 percent, respectively), $\chi^2(13) = 34.92, p = .001$. Finally, an independent samples *t*-test revealed that participants who completed all three waves were slightly older ($M = 42.95$, standard deviation [*SD*] = 16.19) than participants who completed the first and second waves only ($M = 34.52, SD = 12.35$), $t(112.21) = 4.58, p < .001$. In terms of party identification, most participants who completed the first wave only were identified with liberal parties (58 percent), and participants who completed the first and second wave were mostly identified with conservative parties (62 percent). The distribution between participants who identified with liberal and conservative parties among those who completed all three waves was relatively balanced (49 percent) and liberals (51 percent).
4. This data set includes additional exploratory measures unrelated to the target research question.
5. We also conducted several robustness checks to examine whether the effects of perceived liberal and conservative threat on conflict-related attitudes are robust to alternative measures of political ideology other than the dichotomous party identification measure (e.g., continuous measure of party identification, left–right self-placement measure, issue positions). Results from these robustness checks are presented in the Online Appendix, Sections B2 to B5.
6. The process of omitting participants with partial data in either of the three waves of measurement resulted in a final sample of 210 participants.
7. We also conducted a multigroup analysis of our hypothesized moderation models after excluding participants who changed their party identification between the waves of

measurement (see Online Appendix, Section B1). The pattern of our main results remains unchanged.

8. Similar results were found when controlling for gender, age, religiosity, and education (dummy coded). The default model evinced excellent fit to the data, for compromise: $\chi^2_{(df = 29)} = 38.99, p = .102; \chi^2/df = 1.34$; Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) = .97, comparative fit index (CFI) = 1.00; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .03 and for militaristic attitudes: $\chi^2_{(df = 29)} = 49.26, p = .011; \chi^2/df = 1.70$; TLI = .93; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .04, and so did the most parsimonious model (MPM), for compromise: $\chi^2_{(df = 96)} = 103.34, p = .286; \chi^2/df = 1.08$; TLI = .99; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .01; for militaristic attitudes: $\chi^2_{(df = 66)} = 100.10, p = .004; \chi^2/df = 1.52$; TLI = .95; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .03. A χ^2 difference test (CSDT) indicated that the relaxed and MPM models are equivalent in terms of fit; for compromise: $\Delta\chi^2_{(df = 67)} = 64.35, p = .569$ and for militaristic attitudes: $\Delta\chi^2_{(df = 37)} = 50.84, p = .060$.
9. Similar results were obtained with gender, age, religiosity, and education (dummy coded) entered into the models as covariates. For the default models, fit indices were relatively poor; for compromise: $\chi^2_{(df = 28)} = 112.10, p < .001; \chi^2/df = 4.00$; TLI = .81; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .12 and for militaristic attitudes: $\chi^2_{(df = 28)} = 115.49, p < .001; \chi^2/df = 4.12$; TLI = .76; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .12. After removing statistically nonsignificant parameters from the models, arriving at the MPMs, fit indices were somewhat improved; for compromise: $\chi^2_{(df = 92)} = 174.72, p < .001; \chi^2/df = 1.90$; TLI = .93; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .07 and for militaristic attitudes: $\chi^2_{(df = 29)} = 49.26, p = .011; \chi^2/df = 1.70$; TLI = .93; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .07. CSDTs indicated that the relaxed and MPMs are equivalent in terms of fit; for compromise: $\Delta\chi^2_{(df = 65)} = 76.33, p = .159$ and for militaristic attitudes: $\Delta\chi^2_{(df = 64)} = 59.24, p = .645$.

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